Prima Secundae · Vice and Sin

Of the Subject of Original Sin

I-II, q. 83 · Four articles

Prooemium · Thomas's plan for this question

Deinde considerandum est de subiecto originalis peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum subiectum originalis peccati per prius sit caro vel anima. Secundo, si anima, utrum per essentiam aut per potentias suas. Tertio, utrum voluntas per prius sit subiectum peccati originalis quam aliae potentiae. Quarto, utrum aliquae potentiae animae sint specialiter infectae, scilicet generativa, vis concupiscibilis et sensus tactus.

We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul?

(2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers?

(3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin?

(4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch?

1 Whether Original Sin Is More in the Flesh Than in the Soul?
2 Whether Original Sin Is in the Essence of the Soul Rather Than in the Powers?
3 Whether Original Sin Infects the Will Before the Other Powers?
4 Whether the Aforesaid Powers Are More Infected Than the Others?

Articulus I

Whether Original Sin Is More in the Flesh Than in the Soul?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale magis sit in carne quam in anima. Repugnantia enim carnis ad mentem ex corruptione originalis peccati procedit. Sed radix huius repugnantiae in carne consistit, dicit enim apostolus ad Rom. VII, video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae. Ergo originale peccatum in carne principaliter consistit.

It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, unumquodque potius est in causa quam in effectu, sicut calor magis est in igne calefaciente quam in aqua calefacta. Sed anima inficitur infectione originalis peccati per semen carnale. Ergo peccatum originale magis est in carne quam in anima.

Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, peccatum originale ex primo parente contrahimus, prout in eo fuimus secundum rationem seminalem. Sic autem non fuit ibi anima, sed sola caro. Ergo originale peccatum non est in anima, sed in carne.

Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, but in the flesh.

Arg. 4 Objection 4

Praeterea, anima rationalis creata a Deo corpori infunditur. Si igitur anima per peccatum originale inficeretur, consequens esset quod ex sua creatione vel infusione inquinaretur. Et sic Deus esset causa peccati, qui est auctor creationis et infusionis.

Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's creation and fusion.

Arg. 5 Objection 5

Praeterea, nullus sapiens liquorem pretiosum vasi infunderet ex quo sciret ipsum liquorem infici. Sed anima rationalis est pretiosior omni liquore. Si ergo anima ex corporis unione infici posset infectione originalis culpae, Deus, qui ipsa sapientia est, nunquam animam tali corpori infunderet. Infundit autem. Non ergo inquinatur ex carne. Sic igitur peccatum originale non est in anima, sed in carne.

Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod idem est subiectum virtutis et vitii sive peccati, quod contrariatur virtuti. Sed caro non potest esse subiectum virtutis, dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. VII, scio quod non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum. Ergo caro non potest esse subiectum originalis peccati, sed solum anima.

On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." Therefore the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest esse in aliquo dupliciter, uno modo, sicut in causa, vel principali vel instrumentali; alio modo, sicut in subiecto. Peccatum ergo originale omnium hominum fuit quidem in ipso Adam sicut in prima causa principali; secundum illud apostoli, Rom. V, in quo omnes peccaverunt. In semine autem corporali est peccatum originale sicut in causa instrumentali, eo quod per virtutem activam seminis traducitur peccatum originale in prolem, simul cum natura humana. Sed sicut in subiecto, peccatum originale nullo modo potest esse in carne, sed solum in anima. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra dictum est, hoc modo ex voluntate primi parentis peccatum originale traducitur in posteros per quandam generativam motionem, sicut a voluntate alicuius hominis derivatur peccatum actuale ad alias partes eius. In qua quidem derivatione hoc potest attendi, quod quidquid provenit ex motione voluntatis peccati ad quamcumque partem hominis quae quocumque modo potest esse particeps peccati, vel per modum subiecti vel per modum instrumenti, habet rationem culpae, sicut ex voluntate gulae provenit concupiscentia cibi ad concupiscibilem, et sumptio cibi ad manus et os, quae inquantum moventur a voluntate ad peccatum, sunt instrumenta peccati. Quod vero ulterius derivatur ad vim nutritivam et ad interiora membra, quae non sunt nata moveri a voluntate, non habet rationem culpae. Sic igitur, cum anima possit esse subiectum culpae, caro autem de se non habeat quod sit subiectum culpae; quidquid provenit de corruptione primi peccati ad animam, habet rationem culpae; quod autem provenit ad carnem, non habet rationem culpae, sed poenae. Sic igitur anima est subiectum peccati originalis, non autem caro.

I answer that, One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul.

The reason for this is that, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1), original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt.

Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original sin, and not the flesh.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro Retract., apostolus loquitur ibi de homine iam redempto, qui liberatus est a culpa, sed subiacet poenae, ratione cuius peccatum dicitur habitare in carne. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod caro sit subiectum culpae, sed solum poenae.

As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh." Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum originale causatur ex semine sicut ex causa instrumentali. Non autem oportet quod aliquid sit principalius in causa instrumentali quam in effectu, sed solum in causa principali. Et hoc modo peccatum originale potiori modo fuit in Adam, in quo fuit secundum rationem actualis peccati.

Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it had the nature of actual sin.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod anima huius hominis non fuit secundum seminalem rationem in Adam peccante sicut in principio effectivo, sed sicut in principio dispositivo, eo quod semen corporale, quod ex Adam traducitur, sua virtute non efficit animam rationalem, sed ad eam disponit.

The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it.

Ad 4 Reply to Objection 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod infectio originalis peccati nullo modo causatur a Deo, sed ex solo peccato primi parentis per carnalem generationem. Et ideo, cum creatio importet respectum animae ad solum Deum, non potest dici quod anima ex sua creatione inquinetur. Sed infusio importat respectum et ad Deum infundentem, et ad carnem cui infunditur anima. Et ideo, habito respectu ad Deum infundentem, non potest dici quod anima per infusionem maculetur; sed solum habito respectu ad corpus cui infunditur.

The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation. And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused.

Ad 5 Reply to Objection 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod bonum commune praefertur bono singulari. Unde Deus, secundum suam sapientiam, non praetermittit universalem ordinem rerum, qui est ut tali corpori talis anima infundatur, ut vitetur singularis infectio huius animae, praesertim cum natura animae hoc habeat, ut esse non incipiat nisi in corpore, ut in primo habitum est. Melius est autem ei sic esse secundum naturam, quam nullo modo esse, praesertim cum possit per gratiam damnationem evadere.

The common good takes precedence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general order of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 4; Q. 118, A. 3). And it is better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation, by means of grace.

Articulus II

Whether Original Sin Is in the Essence of the Soul Rather Than in the Powers?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit per prius in essentia animae quam in potentiis. Anima enim nata est esse subiectum peccati, quantum ad id quod potest a voluntate moveri. Sed anima non movetur a voluntate secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum potentias. Ergo peccatum originale non est in anima secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum potentias.

It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to be the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its essence, but only according to the powers.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, peccatum originale opponitur originali iustitiae. Sed originalis iustitia erat in aliqua potentia animae, quae est subiectum virtutis. Ergo et peccatum originale est magis in potentia animae quam in eius essentia.

Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its essence.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, sicut a carne peccatum originale derivatur ad animam, ita ab essentia animae derivatur ad potentias. Sed peccatum originale magis est in anima quam in carne. Ergo etiam magis est in potentiis animae quam in essentia.

Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul.

Arg. 4 Objection 4

Praeterea, peccatum originale dicitur esse concupiscentia, ut dictum est. Sed concupiscentia est in potentiis animae. Ergo et peccatum originale.

Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated (Q. 82, A. 3). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod peccatum originale dicitur esse peccatum naturale, ut supra dictum est. Anima autem est forma et natura corporis secundum essentiam suam, et non secundum potentias, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo anima est subiectum originalis peccati principaliter secundum suam essentiam.

On the contrary, Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body, in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated in the First Part (Q. 76, A. 6). Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod illud animae est principaliter subiectum alicuius peccati, ad quod primo pertinet causa motiva illius peccati, sicut si causa motiva ad peccandum sit delectatio sensus, quae pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem sicut obiectum proprium eius, sequitur quod vis concupiscibilis sit proprium subiectum illius peccati. Manifestum est autem quod peccatum originale causatur per originem. Unde illud animae quod primo attingitur ab origine hominis, est primum subiectum originalis peccati. Attingit autem origo animam ut terminum generationis, secundum quod est forma corporis; quod quidem convenit ei secundum essentiam propriam, ut in primo habitum est. Unde anima secundum essentiam est primum subiectum originalis peccati.

I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as it is the form of the body: and this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the First Part (Q. 76, A. 6). Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is the primary subject of original sin.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut motio voluntatis alicuius propriae pervenit ad potentias animae, non autem ad animae essentiam; ita motio voluntatis primi generantis, per viam generationis, pervenit primo ad animae essentiam, ut dictum est.

As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam originalis iustitia pertinebat primordialiter ad essentiam animae, erat enim donum divinitus datum humanae naturae, quam per prius respicit essentia animae quam potentiae. Potentiae enim magis videntur pertinere ad personam, inquantum sunt principia personalium actuum. Unde sunt propria subiecta peccatorum actualium, quae sunt peccata personalia.

Even original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to which the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the person.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus comparatur ad animam sicut materia ad formam, quae etsi sit posterior ordine generationis, est tamen prior ordine perfectionis et naturae. Essentia autem animae comparatur ad potentias sicut subiecta ad accidentia propria, quae sunt posteriora subiecto et ordine generationis et etiam perfectionis. Unde non est similis ratio.

The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless comes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails.

Ad 4 Reply to Objection 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod concupiscentia se habet materialiter et ex consequenti in peccato originali, ut supra dictum est.

Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as stated above (Q. 82, A. 3).

Articulus III

Whether Original Sin Infects the Will Before the Other Powers?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non per prius inficiat voluntatem quam alias potentias. Omne enim peccatum principaliter pertinet ad potentiam per cuius actum causatur. Sed peccatum originale causatur per actum generativae potentiae. Ergo inter ceteras potentias animae, videtur magis pertinere ad generativam potentiam.

It would seem that original sin does not infect the will before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power by whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative power more than to the others.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, peccatum originale per semen carnale traducitur. Sed aliae vires animae propinquiores sunt carni quam voluntas, sicut patet de omnibus sensitivis, quae utuntur organo corporali. Ergo in eis magis est peccatum originale quam in voluntate.

Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than in the will.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, intellectus est prior voluntate, non enim est voluntas nisi de bono intellecto. Si ergo peccatum originale inficit omnes potentias animae, videtur quod per prius inficiat intellectum, tanquam priorem.

Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod iustitia originalis per prius respicit voluntatem, est enim rectitudo voluntatis, ut Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu virginali. Ergo et peccatum originale, quod ei opponitur, per prius respicit voluntatem.

On the contrary, Original justice has a prior relation to the will, because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod in infectione peccati originalis duo est considerare. Primo quidem, inhaerentiam eius ad subiectum, et secundum hoc primo respicit essentiam animae, ut dictum est. Deinde oportet considerare inclinationem eius ad actum, et hoc modo respicit potentias animae. Oportet ergo quod illam per prius respiciat, quae primam inclinationem habet ad peccandum. Haec autem est voluntas, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde peccatum originale per prius respicit voluntatem.

I answer that, Two things must be considered in the infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above (A. 2). In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore regard first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as stated above (Q. 74, AA. 1, 2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the will.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale non causatur in homine per potentiam generativam prolis, sed per actum potentiae generativae parentis. Unde non oportet quod sua potentia generativa sit primum subiectum originalis peccati.

Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power. Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum originale habet duplicem processum, unum quidem a carne ad animam; alium vero ab essentia animae ad potentias. Primus quidem processus est secundum ordinem generationis, secundus autem secundum ordinem perfectionis. Et ideo quamvis aliae potentiae, scilicet sensitivae, propinquiores sint carni; quia tamen voluntas est propinquior essentiae animae, tanquam superior potentia, primo pervenit ad ipsam infectio originalis peccati.

Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers, are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of original sin reaches it first.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus quodam modo praecedit voluntatem, inquantum proponit ei suum obiectum. Alio vero modo voluntas praecedit intellectum, secundum ordinem motionis ad actum, quae quidem motio pertinet ad peccatum.

The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect, in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin.

Articulus IV

Whether the Aforesaid Powers Are More Infected Than the Others?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedictae potentiae non sint magis infectae quam aliae. Infectio enim originalis peccati magis videtur pertinere ad illam animae partem quae prius potest esse subiectum peccati. Haec autem est rationalis pars, et praecipue voluntas. Ergo ipsa est magis infecta per peccatum originale.

It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, nulla vis animae inficitur per culpam, nisi inquantum potest obedire rationi. Generativa autem non potest obedire, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo generativa non est maxime infecta per originale peccatum.

Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most infected by original sin.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, visus inter alios sensus est spiritualior et propinquior rationi, inquantum plures differentias rerum ostendit, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Sed infectio culpae primo est in ratione. Ergo visus magis est infectus quam tactus.

Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number of things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod infectio originalis culpae maxime apparet in motu genitalium membrorum, qui rationi non subditur. Sed illa membra deserviunt generativae virtuti in commixtione sexuum, in qua est delectatio secundum tactum, quae maxime concupiscentiam movet. Ergo infectio originalis peccati maxime pertinet ad ista tria, scilicet potentiam generativam, vim concupiscibilem et sensum tactus.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod illa corruptio praecipue infectio nominari solet, quae nata est in aliud transferri, unde et morbi contagiosi, sicut lepra et scabies et huiusmodi, infectiones dicuntur. Corruptio autem originalis peccati traducitur per actum generationis, sicut supra dictum est. Unde potentiae quae ad huiusmodi actum concurrunt, maxime dicuntur esse infectae. Huiusmodi autem actus deservit generativae, inquantum ad generationem ordinatur, habet autem in se delectationem tactus, quae est maximum obiectum concupiscibilis. Et ideo, cum omnes partes animae dicantur esse corruptae per peccatum originale, specialiter tres praedictae dicuntur esse corruptae et infectae.

I answer that, Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves the generative power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which is the most powerful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale ex ea parte qua inclinat in peccata actualia, praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem, ut dictum est. Sed ex ea parte qua traducitur in prolem, pertinet propinque ad potentias praedictas, ad voluntatem autem remote.

Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above (A. 3). But in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod infectio actualis culpae non pertinet nisi ad potentias quae moventur a voluntate peccantis. Sed infectio originalis culpae non derivatur a voluntate eius qui ipsam contrahit, sed per originem naturae, cui deservit potentia generativa. Et ideo in ea est infectio originalis peccati.

The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power. Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod visus non pertinet ad actum generationis nisi secundum dispositionem remotam, prout scilicet per visum apparet species concupiscibilis. Sed delectatio perficitur in tactu. Et ideo talis infectio magis attribuitur tactui quam visui.

Sight is not related to the act of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch rather than to the sight.

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