Prima Secundae · Virtues

Of the Theological Virtues

I-II, q. 62 · Four articles

Prooemium · Thomas's plan for this question

Deinde considerandum est de virtutibus theologicis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. Secundo, utrum virtutes theologicae distinguantur ab intellectualibus et moralibus. Tertio, quot, et quae sint. Quarto, de ordine earum.

We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?

(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?

(3) How many, and which are they?

(4) Of their order.

  1. 1 Whether There Are Any Theological Virtues?
  2. 2 Whether the Theological Virtues Are Distinct from the Intellectual and Moral Virtues?
  3. 3 Whether Faith, Hope, and Charity Are Fittingly Reckoned As Theological Virtues?
  4. 4 Whether Faith Precedes Hope, and Hope Charity?

Articulus I

Whether There Are Any Theological Virtues?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. Ut enim dicitur in VII Physic., virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, dico autem perfectum, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Sed id quod est divinum, est supra naturam hominis. Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes hominis.

It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, virtutes theologicae dicuntur quasi virtutes divinae. Sed virtutes divinae sunt exemplares, ut dictum est, quae quidem non sunt in nobis, sed in Deo. Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes hominis.

Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 5), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, virtutes theologicae dicuntur quibus ordinamur in Deum, qui est primum principium et ultimus finis rerum. Sed homo ex ipsa natura rationis et voluntatis, habet ordinem ad primum principium et ultimum finem. Non ergo requiruntur aliqui habitus virtutum theologicarum, quibus ratio et voluntas ordinetur in Deum.

Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod praecepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum. Sed de actibus fidei, spei et caritatis dantur praecepta in lege divina, dicitur enim Eccli. II, qui timetis Deum, credite illi; item, sperate in illum; item, diligite illum. Ergo fides, spes et caritas sunt virtutes in Deum ordinantes. Sunt ergo theologicae.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur, ut ex supradictis patet. Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est. Una quidem proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem; secundum quod dicitur II Petr. I, quod per Christum facti sumus consortes divinae naturae. Et quia huiusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum hominem in beatitudinem praedictam. Unde oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, tum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur.

I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (Q. 5, A. 7). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (Q. 5, A. 5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the Divine nature." And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliqua natura potest attribui alicui rei dupliciter. Uno modo, essentialiter, et sic huiusmodi virtutes theologicae excedunt hominis naturam. Alio modo, participative, sicut lignum ignitum participat naturam ignis, et sic quodammodo fit homo particeps divinae naturae, ut dictum est. Et sic istae virtutes conveniunt homini secundum naturam participatam.

A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod istae virtutes non dicuntur divinae, sicut quibus Deus sit virtuosus, sed sicut quibus nos efficimur virtuosi a Deo, et in ordine ad Deum. Unde non sunt exemplares, sed exemplatae.

These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ad Deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur prout est naturae principium et finis, secundum tamen proportionem naturae. Sed ad ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, ratio et voluntas secundum suam naturam non ordinantur sufficienter.

The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural happiness.

Articulus II

Whether the Theological Virtues Are Distinct from the Intellectual and Moral Virtues?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes theologicae non distinguantur a moralibus et intellectualibus. Virtutes enim theologicae, si sunt in anima humana, oportet quod perficiant ipsam vel secundum partem intellectivam vel secundum partem appetitivam. Sed virtutes quae perficiunt partem intellectivam, dicuntur intellectuales, virtutes autem quae perficiunt partem appetitivam, sunt morales. Ergo virtutes theologicae non distinguuntur a virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus.

It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, virtutes theologicae dicuntur quae ordinant nos ad Deum. Sed inter intellectuales virtutes est aliqua quae ordinat nos ad Deum, scilicet sapientia, quae est de divinis, utpote causam altissimam considerans. Ergo virtutes theologicae ab intellectualibus virtutibus non distinguuntur.

Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccles., manifestat in quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus quod sunt ordo amoris. Sed amor est caritas, quae ponitur virtus theologica. Ergo virtutes morales non distinguuntur a theologicis.

Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity, which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra, id quod est supra naturam hominis, distinguitur ab eo quod est secundum naturam hominis. Sed virtutes theologicae sunt super naturam hominis, cui secundum naturam conveniunt virtutes intellectuales et morales, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo distinguuntur ab invicem.

On the contrary, That which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above (Q. 58, A. 3). Therefore they are distinct from one another.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur secundum formalem differentiam obiectorum. Obiectum autem theologicarum virtutum est ipse Deus, qui est ultimus rerum finis, prout nostrae rationis cognitionem excedit. Obiectum autem virtutum intellectualium et moralium est aliquid quod humana ratione comprehendi potest. Unde virtutes theologicae specie distinguuntur a moralibus et intellectualibus.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales et morales perficiunt intellectum et appetitum hominis secundum proportionem naturae humanae, sed theologicae supernaturaliter.

The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological virtues, supernaturally.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod sapientia quae a philosopho ponitur intellectualis virtus, considerat divina secundum quod sunt investigabilia ratione humana. Sed theologica virtus est circa ea secundum quod rationem humanam excedunt.

The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3, 7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human reason.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet caritas sit amor, non tamen omnis amor est caritas. Cum ergo dicitur quod omnis virtus est ordo amoris, potest intelligi vel de amore communiter dicto; vel de amore caritatis. Si de amore communiter dicto, sic dicitur quaelibet virtus esse ordo amoris, inquantum ad quamlibet cardinalium virtutum requiritur ordinata affectio, omnis autem affectionis radix et principium est amor, ut supra dictum est. Si autem intelligatur de amore caritatis, non datur per hoc intelligi quod quaelibet alia virtus essentialiter sit caritas, sed quod omnes aliae virtutes aliqualiter a caritate dependeant, ut infra patebit.

Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4; Q. 28, A. 6, ad 2; Q. 41, A. 2, ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Q. 65, AA. 2, 5; II-II, Q. 23, A. 7).

Articulus III

Whether Faith, Hope, and Charity Are Fittingly Reckoned As Theological Virtues?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur tres virtutes theologicae, fides, spes et caritas. Virtutes enim theologicae se habent in ordine ad beatitudinem divinam, sicut inclinatio naturae ad finem connaturalem. Sed inter virtutes ordinatas ad finem connaturalem, ponitur una sola virtus naturalis, scilicet intellectus principiorum. Ergo debet poni una sola virtus theologica.

It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but one theological virtue.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, theologicae virtutes sunt perfectiores virtutibus intellectualibus et moralibus. Sed inter intellectuales virtutes fides non ponitur, sed est aliquid minus virtute, cum sit cognitio imperfecta. Similiter etiam inter virtutes morales non ponitur spes, sed est aliquid minus virtute, cum sit passio. Ergo multo minus debent poni virtutes theologicae.

Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, virtutes theologicae ordinant animam hominis ad Deum. Sed ad Deum non potest anima hominis ordinari nisi per intellectivam partem, in qua est intellectus et voluntas. Ergo non debent esse nisi duae virtutes theologicae, una quae perficiat intellectum, alia quae perficiat voluntatem.

Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God. Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the will.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three."

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes theologicae hoc modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem. Hoc autem contingit secundum duo. Primo quidem, secundum rationem vel intellectum, inquantum continet prima principia universalia cognita nobis per naturale lumen intellectus, ex quibus procedit ratio tam in speculandis quam in agendis. Secundo, per rectitudinem voluntatis naturaliter tendentis in bonum rationis. Sed haec duo deficiunt ab ordine beatitudinis supernaturalis; secundum illud I ad Cor. II, oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se. Unde oportuit quod quantum ad utrumque, aliquid homini supernaturaliter adderetur, ad ordinandum ipsum in finem supernaturalem. Et primo quidem, quantum ad intellectum, adduntur homini quaedam principia supernaturalia, quae divino lumine capiuntur, et haec sunt credibilia, de quibus est fides. Secundo vero, voluntas ordinatur in illum finem et quantum ad motum intentionis, in ipsum tendentem sicut in id quod est possibile consequi, quod pertinet ad spem, et quantum ad unionem quandam spiritualem, per quam quodammodo transformatur in illum finem, quod fit per caritatem. Appetitus enim uniuscuiusque rei naturaliter movetur et tendit in finem sibi connaturalem, et iste motus provenit ex quadam conformitate rei ad suum finem.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are reason's starting-point, both in speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined by reason.

But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that end as something attainable—and this pertains to hope—and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end—and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus indiget speciebus intelligibilibus, per quas intelligat, et ideo oportet quod in eo ponatur aliquis habitus naturalis superadditus potentiae. Sed ipsa natura voluntatis sufficit ad naturalem ordinem in finem, sive quantum ad intentionem finis, sive quantum ad conformitatem ad ipsum. Sed in ordine ad ea quae supra naturam sunt, ad nihil horum sufficit natura potentiae. Et ideo oportet fieri superadditionem habitus supernaturalis quantum ad utrumque.

The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod fides et spes imperfectionem quandam important, quia fides est de his quae non videntur, et spes de his quae non habentur. Unde habere fidem et spem de his quae subduntur humanae potestati, deficit a ratione virtutis. Sed habere fidem et spem de his quae sunt supra facultatem naturae humanae, excedit omnem virtutem homini proportionatam; secundum illud I ad Cor. I, quod infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus.

Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: "The weakness of God is stronger than men."

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ad appetitum duo pertinent, scilicet motus in finem; et conformatio ad finem per amorem. Et sic oportet quod in appetitu humano duae virtutes theologicae ponantur, scilicet spes et caritas.

Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity.

Articulus IV

Whether Faith Precedes Hope, and Hope Charity?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit hic ordo theologicarum virtutum, quod fides sit prior spe, et spes prior caritate. Radix enim est prior eo quod est ex radice. Sed caritas est radix omnium virtutum; secundum illud ad Ephes. III, in caritate radicati et fundati. Ergo caritas est prior aliis.

It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: "Being rooted and founded in charity." Therefore charity precedes the others.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., non potest aliquis diligere quod esse non crediderit. Porro si credit et diligit, bene agendo efficit ut etiam speret. Ergo videtur quod fides praecedat caritatem, et caritas spem.

Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping." Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, amor est principium omnis affectionis, ut supra dictum est. Sed spes nominat quandam affectionem; est enim quaedam passio, ut supra dictum est. Ergo caritas, quae est amor, est prior spe.

Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it is a passion, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est ordo quo apostolus ista enumerat, dicens, nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas.

On the contrary, The Apostle enumerates them thus (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity."

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est ordo, scilicet generationis, et perfectionis. Ordine quidem generationis, quo materia est prior forma, et imperfectum perfecto, in uno et eodem; fides praecedit spem, et spes caritatem, secundum actus (nam habitus simul infunduntur). Non enim potest in aliquid motus appetitivus tendere vel sperando vel amando, nisi quod est apprehensum sensu aut intellectu. Per fidem autem apprehendit intellectus ea quae sperat et amat. Unde oportet quod, ordine generationis, fides praecedat spem et caritatem. Similiter autem ex hoc homo aliquid amat, quod apprehendit illud ut bonum suum. Per hoc autem quod homo ab aliquo sperat se bonum consequi posse, reputat ipsum in quo spem habet, quoddam bonum suum. Unde ex hoc ipso quod homo sperat de aliquo, procedit ad amandum ipsum. Et sic, ordine generationis, secundum actus, spes praecedit caritatem. Ordine vero perfectionis, caritas praecedit fidem et spem, eo quod tam fides quam spes per caritatem formatur, et perfectionem virtutis acquirit. Sic enim caritas est mater omnium virtutum et radix, inquantum est omnium virtutum forma, ut infra dicetur.

I answer that, Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, unless that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity. In like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards their respective acts.

But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on (II-II, Q. 23, A. 8).

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.

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Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de spe qua quis sperat ex meritis iam habitis se ad beatitudinem perventurum, quod est spei formatae, quae sequitur caritatem. Potest autem aliquis sperare antequam habeat caritatem, non ex meritis quae iam habet, sed quae sperat se habiturum.

Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not already possessed, but which he hopes to possess.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, spes respicit duo. Unum quidem sicut principale obiectum, scilicet bonum quod speratur. Et respectu huius, semper amor praecedit spem, nunquam enim speratur aliquod bonum nisi desideratum et amatum. Respicit etiam spes illum a quo se sperat posse consequi bonum. Et respectu huius, primo quidem spes praecedit amorem; quamvis postea ex ipso amore spes augeatur. Per hoc enim quod aliquis reputat per aliquem se posse consequi aliquod bonum, incipit amare ipsum, et ex hoc ipso quod ipsum amat, postea fortius de eo sperat.

As stated above (Q. 40, A. 7), in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. With regard to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards hope is increased by love. Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him.

Ad argumenta Reply to the objections

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This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Showing Thomas's answers only.