Tertia Pars · Penance

Of the Parts of Penance, in General

III, q. 90 · Four articles

Prooemium · Thomas's plan for this question

Deinde considerandum est de partibus poenitentiae. Et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali de singulis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum poenitentia habeat partes. Secundo, de numero partium. Tertio, quales partes sint. Quarto, de divisione eius in partes subiectivas.

We must now consider the parts of Penance: (1) in general; (2) each one in particular.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Penance has any parts?

(2) Of the number of its parts;

(3) What kind of parts are they?

(4) Of its division into subjective parts.

  1. 1 Whether Penance Should Be Assigned Any Parts?
  2. 2 Whether Contrition, Confession, and Satisfaction Are Fittingly Assigned As Parts of Penance?
  3. 3 Whether These Three Are Integral Parts of Penance?
  4. 4 Whether Penance Is Fittingly Divided into Penance Before Baptism, Penance for Mortal Sins, and Penance for Venial Sins?

Articulus I

Whether Penance Should Be Assigned Any Parts?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod poenitentiae non debent partes assignari. Sacramenta enim sunt in quibus divina virtus secretius operatur salutem. Sed virtus divina est una et simplex. Non ergo poenitentiae, cum sit sacramentum, debent partes assignari.

It would seem that parts should not be assigned to Penance. For it is the Divine power that works our salvation most secretly in the sacraments. Now the Divine power is one and simple. Therefore Penance, being a sacrament, should have no parts assigned to it.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, poenitentia est virtus, et est sacramentum. Sed ei inquantum est virtus, non assignantur partes, cum virtus sit habitus quidam, qui est simplex qualitas mentis. Similiter etiam ei poenitentiae inquantum est sacramentum, non videtur quod partes sint assignandae, quia Baptismo et aliis sacramentis non assignantur partes. Ergo poenitentiae nullae debent partes assignari.

Further, Penance is both a virtue and a sacrament. Now no parts are assigned to it as a virtue, since virtue is a habit, which is a simple quality of the mind. In like manner, it seems that parts should not be assigned to Penance as a sacrament, because no parts are assigned to Baptism and the other sacraments. Therefore no parts at all should be assigned to Penance.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, poenitentiae materia est peccatum, ut supra dictum est. Sed peccato non assignantur partes. Ergo etiam nec poenitentiae sunt partes assignandae.

Further, the matter of Penance is sin, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 2). But no parts are assigned to sin. Neither, therefore, should parts be assigned to Penance.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod partes sunt ex quibus perfectio alicuius integratur. Sed poenitentiae perfectio integratur ex pluribus, scilicet ex contritione, confessione et satisfactione. Ergo poenitentia habet partes.

On the contrary, The parts of a thing are those out of which the whole is composed. Now the perfection of Penance is composed of several things, viz. contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Therefore Penance has parts.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod partes rei sunt in quas materialiter totum dividitur, habent enim se partes ad totum sicut materia ad formam; unde in II Physic. partes ponuntur in genere causae materialis, totum autem in genere causae formalis. Ubicumque igitur ex parte materiae invenitur aliqua pluralitas, ibi est invenire partium rationem. Dictum est autem supra quod in sacramento poenitentiae actus humani se habent per modum materiae. Et ideo, cum plures actus humani requirantur ad perfectionem poenitentiae, scilicet contritio, confessio et satisfactio, ut infra patebit, consequens est quod sacramentum poenitentiae habeat partes.

I answer that, The parts of a thing are those into which the whole is divided materially, for the parts of a thing are to the whole, what matter is to the form; wherefore the parts are reckoned as a kind of material cause, and the whole as a kind of formal cause (Phys. ii). Accordingly wherever, on the part of matter, we find a kind of plurality, there we shall find a reason for assigning parts.

Now it has been stated above (Q. 84, AA. 2, 3), that, in the sacrament of Penance, human actions stand as matter: and so, since several actions are requisite for the perfection of Penance, viz., contrition, confession, and satisfaction, as we shall show further on (A. 2), it follows that the sacrament of Penance has parts.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quodlibet sacramentum habet simplicitatem ratione virtutis divinae, quae in eo operatur. Sed virtus divina, propter sui magnitudinem, operari potest et per unum et per multa, ratione quorum alicui sacramento possunt partes assignari.

Every sacrament is something simple by reason of the Divine power, which operates therein: but the Divine power is so great that it can operate both through one and through many, and by reason of these many, parts may be assigned to a particular sacrament.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod poenitentiae secundum quod est virtus, non assignantur partes, actus enim humani, qui multiplicantur in poenitentia, non comparantur ad habitum virtutis sicut partes, sed sicut effectus. Unde relinquitur quod partes assignentur poenitentiae inquantum est sacramentum, ad quod actus humani comparantur ut materia. In aliis autem sacramentis materia non sunt actus humani, sed aliqua res exterior, una quidem simplex, ut aqua vel oleum; sive composita, ut chrisma. Et ideo aliis sacramentis non assignantur partes.

Parts are not assigned to penance as a virtue: because the human acts of which there are several in penance, are related to the habit of virtue, not as its parts, but as its effects. It follows, therefore, that parts are assigned to Penance as a sacrament, to which the human acts are related as matter: whereas in the other sacraments the matter does not consist of human acts, but of some one external thing, either simple, as water or oil, or compound, as chrism, and so parts are not assigned to the other sacraments.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod peccata sunt materia remota poenitentiae, inquantum scilicet sunt ut materia vel obiectum humanorum actuum, qui sunt propria materia poenitentiae prout est sacramentum.

Sins are the remote matter of Penance, inasmuch, to wit, as they are the matter or object of the human acts, which are the proper matter of Penance as a sacrament.

Articulus II

Whether Contrition, Confession, and Satisfaction Are Fittingly Assigned As Parts of Penance?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur partes poenitentiae contritio, confessio et satisfactio. Contritio enim est in corde, et sic pertinet ad interiorem poenitentiam. Confessio autem est in ore, et satisfactio in opere, et sic duo ultima pertinent ad poenitentiam exteriorem. Poenitentia autem interior non est sacramentum, sed sola poenitentia exterior, quae sensui subiacet. Non ergo convenienter assignantur hae partes sacramento poenitentiae.

It would seem that contrition, confession, and satisfaction are not fittingly assigned as parts of Penance. For contrition is in the heart, and so belongs to interior penance; while confession consists of words, and satisfaction in deeds; so that the two latter belong to interior penance. Now interior penance is not a sacrament, but only exterior penance which is perceptible by the senses. Therefore these three parts are not fittingly assigned to the sacrament of Penance.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, in sacramento novae legis confertur gratia, ut supra habitum est. Sed in satisfactione non confertur aliqua gratia. Ergo satisfactio non est pars sacramenti.

Further, grace is conferred in the sacraments of the New Law, as stated above (Q. 62, AA. 1, 3). But no grace is conferred in satisfaction. Therefore satisfaction is not part of a sacrament.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, non est idem fructus rei et pars. Sed satisfactio est fructus poenitentiae, secundum illud Luc. III, facite vobis dignos fructus poenitentiae. Ergo non est pars poenitentiae.

Further, the fruit of a thing is not the same as its part. But satisfaction is a fruit of penance, according to Luke 3:8: "Bring forth . . . fruits worthy of penance." Therefore it is not a part of Penance.

Arg. 4 Objection 4

Praeterea, poenitentia ordinatur contra peccatum. Sed peccatum potest perfici solum in corde per consensum, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Ergo et poenitentia. Non ergo debent poenitentiae partes poni confessio oris et satisfactio operis.

Further, Penance is ordained against sin. But sin can be completed merely in the thought by consent, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 72, A. 7): therefore Penance can also. Therefore confession in word and satisfaction in deed should not be reckoned as parts of Penance.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra, videtur quod debeant poni plures partes poenitentiae. Pars enim hominis ponitur non solum corpus, quasi materia, sed etiam anima, quae est forma. Sed tria praedicta, cum sint actus poenitentis, se habent sicut materia, absolutio autem sacerdotis se habet per modum formae. Ergo absolutio sacerdotis debet poni quarta pars poenitentiae.

On the contrary, It seems that yet more parts should be assigned to Penance. For not only is the body assigned as a part of man, as being the matter, but also the soul, which is his form. But the aforesaid three, being the acts of the penitent, stand as matter, while the priestly absolution stands as form. Therefore the priestly absolution should be assigned as a fourth part of Penance.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est pars, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. scilicet pars essentiae, et pars quantitatis. Partes quidem essentiae sunt, naturaliter quidem, forma et materia, logice autem, genus et differentia. Hoc autem modo quodlibet sacramentum distinguitur in materiam et formam sicut in partes essentiae, unde et supra dictum est quod sacramenta consistunt in rebus et verbis. Sed quia quantitas se tenet ex parte materiae, partes quantitatis sunt partes materiae. Et hoc modo sacramento poenitentiae specialiter assignantur partes, ut supra dictum est, quantum ad actus poenitentis, qui sunt materia huius sacramenti. Dictum est autem supra quod alio modo fit recompensatio offensae in poenitentia, et in vindicativa iustitia. Nam in vindicativa iustitia fit recompensatio secundum arbitrium iudicis, non secundum voluntatem offendentis vel offensi, sed in poenitentia fit recompensatio offensae secundum voluntatem peccantis, et secundum arbitrium Dei, in quem peccatur; quia hic non quaeritur sola reintegratio aequalitatis iustitiae, sicut in iustitia vindicativa, sed magis reconciliatio amicitiae, quod fit dum offendens recompensat secundum voluntatem eius quem offendit. Sic igitur requiritur ex parte poenitentis, primo quidem, voluntas recompensandi, quod fit per contritionem; secundo, quod se subiiciat arbitrio sacerdotis loco Dei, quod fit in confessione; tertio, quod recompenset secundum arbitrium ministri Dei, quod fit in satisfactione. Et ideo contritio, confessio et satisfactio ponuntur partes poenitentiae.

I answer that, A part is twofold, essential and quantitative. The essential parts are naturally the form and the matter, and logically the genus and the difference. In this way, each sacrament is divided into matter and form as its essential parts. Hence it has been said above (Q. 60, AA. 5, 6) that sacraments consist of things and words. But since quantity is on the part of matter, quantitative parts are parts of matter: and, in this way, as stated above (A. 1), parts are assigned specially to the sacrament of Penance, as regards the acts of the penitent, which are the matter of this sacrament.

Now it has been said above (Q. 85, A. 3, ad 3) that an offense is atoned otherwise in Penance than in vindictive justice. Because, in vindictive justice the atonement is made according to the judge's decision, and not according to the discretion of the offender or of the person offended; whereas, in Penance, the offense is atoned according to the will of the sinner, and the judgment of God against Whom the sin was committed, because in the latter case we seek not only the restoration of the equality of justice, as in vindictive justice, but also and still more the reconciliation of friendship, which is accomplished by the offender making atonement according to the will of the person offended. Accordingly the first requisite on the part of the penitent is the will to atone, and this is done by contrition; the second is that he submit to the judgment of the priest standing in God's place, and this is done in confession; and the third is that he atone according to the decision of God's minister, and this is done in satisfaction: and so contrition, confession, and satisfaction are assigned as parts of Penance.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod contritio secundum essentiam quidem est in corde, et pertinet ad interiorem poenitentiam, virtualiter autem pertinet ad poenitentiam exteriorem, inquantum scilicet implicat propositum confitendi et satisfaciendi.

Contrition, as to its essence, is in the heart, and belongs to interior penance; yet, virtually, it belongs to exterior penance, inasmuch as it implies the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod satisfactio confert gratiam prout est in proposito, et auget eam prout est in executione, sicut Baptismus in adultis, ut supra dictum est.

Satisfaction confers grace, in so far as it is in man's purpose, and it increases grace, according as it is accomplished, just as Baptism does in adults, as stated above (Q. 68, A. 2; Q. 69, A. 8).

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod satisfactio est pars poenitentiae sacramenti; fructus autem poenitentiae virtutis.

Satisfaction is a part of Penance as a sacrament, and a fruit of penance as a virtue.

Ad 4 Reply to Objection 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod plura requiruntur ad bonum, quod procedit ex integra causa, quam ad malum, quod procedit ex singularibus defectibus, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Et ideo, licet peccatum perficiatur in consensu cordis, ad perfectionem tamen poenitentiae requiritur et contritio cordis, et confessio oris, et satisfactio operis.

More things are required for good, "which proceeds from a cause that is entire," than for evil, "which results from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). And thus, although sin is completed in the consent of the heart, yet the perfection of Penance requires contrition of the heart, together with confession in word and satisfaction in deed.

Ad 5 Reply to Objection 5

Ad contrarium patet solutio per ea quae dicta sunt.

The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.

Articulus III

Whether These Three Are Integral Parts of Penance?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedicta tria non sint partes integrales poenitentiae. Poenitentia enim, ut dictum est, contra peccatum ordinatur. Sed peccatum cordis, oris et operis sunt partes subiectivae peccati, et non partes integrales, quia peccatum de quolibet horum praedicatur. Ergo etiam in poenitentia contritio cordis et confessio oris et satisfactio operis non sunt partes integrales.

It would seem that these three are not integral parts of Penance. For, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 3), Penance is ordained against sin. But sins of thought, word, and deed are the subjective and not integral parts of sin, because sin is predicated of each one of them. Therefore in Penance also, contrition in thought, confession in word, and satisfaction in deed are not integral parts.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, nulla pars integralis in se continet aliam sibi condivisam. Sed contritio continet in se confessionem et satisfactionem in proposito. Ergo non sunt partes integrales.

Further, no integral part includes within itself another that is condivided with it. But contrition includes both confession and satisfaction in the purpose of amendment. Therefore they are not integral parts.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, ex partibus integralibus simul et aequaliter constituitur totum, sicut linea ex suis partibus. Sed hoc non contingit hic. Ergo praedicta non sunt partes integrales poenitentiae.

Further, a whole is composed of its integral parts, taken at the same time and equally, just as a line is made up of its parts. But such is not the case here. Therefore these are not integral parts of Penance.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra, illae dicuntur partes integrales ex quibus integratur perfectio totius. Sed ex tribus praedictis integratur perfectio poenitentiae. Ergo sunt partes integrales poenitentiae.

On the contrary, Integral parts are those by which the perfection of the whole is integrated. But the perfection of Penance is integrated by these three. Therefore they are integral parts of Penance.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt haec tria esse partes subiectivas poenitentiae. Sed hoc non potest esse. Quia partibus subiectivis singulis adest tota virtus totius, et simul, et aequaliter, sicut tota virtus animalis, inquantum est animal, salvatur in qualibet specie animalis, quae simul et aequaliter dividunt animal. Sed hoc non est in proposito. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod sunt partes potentiales. Sed nec hoc iterum esse potest. Quia singulis partibus potentialibus adest totum secundum totam essentiam, sicut tota essentia animae adest cuilibet eius potentiae. Sed hoc non est in proposito. Unde relinquitur quod praedicta tria sint partes integrales poenitentiae, ad quarum rationem exigitur ut totum non adsit singulis partibus neque secundum totam virtutem eius, neque secundum totam essentiam, sed omnibus simul.

I answer that, Some have said that these three are subjective parts of Penance. But this is impossible, because the entire power of the whole is present in each subjective part at the same time and equally, just as the entire power of an animal, as such, is assured to each animal species, all of which species divide the animal genus at the same time and equally: which does not apply to the point in question. Wherefore others have said that these are potential parts: yet neither can this be true, since the whole is present, as to the entire essence, in each potential part, just as the entire essence of the soul is present in each of its powers: which does not apply to the case in point. Therefore it follows that these three are integral parts of Penance, the nature of which is that the whole is not present in each of the parts, either as to its entire power, or as to its entire essence, but that it is present to all of them together at the same time.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum, quia rationem mali habet, potest in uno tantum perfici, ut dictum est. Et ideo peccatum quod in solo corde perficitur, est una species peccati. Alia vero species est peccatum quod perficitur in corde et ore. Tertia vero species est peccatum quod perficitur in corde et opere. Et huius peccati partes quasi integrales sunt quod est in corde, et quod est in ore, et quod est in opere. Et ideo poenitentiae, quae in his tribus perficitur, haec tria sunt partes integrales.

Sin forasmuch as it is an evil, can be completed in one single point, as stated above (A. 2, ad 4); and so the sin which is completed in thought alone, is a special kind of sin. Another species is the sin that is completed in thought and word: and yet a third species is the sin that is completed in thought, word, and deed; and the quasi-integral parts of this last sin, are that which is in thought, that which is in word, and that which is in deed. Wherefore these three are the integral parts of Penance, which is completed in them.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod una pars integralis potest continere totum, licet non secundum essentiam, fundamentum enim quodammodo virtute continet totum aedificium. Et hoc modo contritio continet virtute totam poenitentiam.

One integral part can include the whole, though not as to its essence: because the foundation, in a way, contains virtually the whole building. In this way contrition includes virtually the whole of Penance.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes partes integrales habent ordinem quendam ad invicem. Sed quaedam habent ordinem tantum in situ, sive consequenter se habeant, sicut partes exercitus; sive se tangant, sicut partes acervi; sive etiam colligentur, sicut partes domus; sive etiam continuentur, sicut partes lineae. Quaedam vero habent insuper ordinem virtutis, sicut partes animalis, quarum prima virtute est cor, et aliae quodam ordine virtutis dependent ab invicem. Tertio modo ordinantur ordine temporis, sicut partes temporis et motus. Partes igitur poenitentiae habent ad invicem ordinem virtutis et temporis, quia sunt actus; non autem ordinem situs, quia non habent positionem.

All integral parts have a certain relation of order to one another: but some are only related as to position, whether in sequence as the parts of an army, or by contact, as the parts of a heap, or by being fitted together, as the parts of a house, or by continuation, as the parts of a line; while some are related, in addition, as to power, as the parts of an animal, the first of which is the heart, the others in a certain order being dependent on one another: and thirdly some are related in the order of time: as the parts of time and movement. Accordingly the parts of Penance are related to one another in the order of power and time, since they are actions, but not in the order of position, since they do not occupy a place.

Articulus IV

Whether Penance Is Fittingly Divided into Penance Before Baptism, Penance for Mortal Sins, and Penance for Venial Sins?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dividatur poenitentia in poenitentiam ante Baptismum, et poenitentiam mortalium, et poenitentiam venialium. Poenitentia enim est secunda tabula post naufragium, ut supra dictum est, Baptismus autem prima. Illud ergo quod est ante Baptismum, non debet poni species poenitentiae.

It would seem that penance is unfittingly divided into penance before Baptism, penance for mortal, and penance for venial sins. For Penance is the second plank after shipwreck, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 6), while Baptism is the first. Therefore that which precedes Baptism should not be called a species of penance.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, quod potest destruere maius, potest etiam destruere minus. Sed mortale est maius peccatum quam veniale. Illa vero poenitentia quae est de mortalibus, eadem etiam est de venialibus. Non ergo debent poni diversae species poenitentiae.

Further, that which can destroy the greater, can destroy the lesser. Now mortal sin is greater than venial; and penance which regards mortal sins regards also venial sins. Therefore they should not be considered as different species of penance.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, sicut post Baptismum peccatur venialiter et mortaliter, ita etiam ante Baptismum. Si ergo post Baptismum distinguitur poenitentia venialium et mortalium, pari ratione debet distingui ante Baptismum. Non ergo convenienter distinguitur poenitentia per has species.

Further, just as after Baptism man commits venial and mortal sins, so does he before Baptism. If therefore penance for venial sins is distinct from penance for mortal sins after Baptism, in like manner they should be distinguished before Baptism. Therefore penance is not fittingly divided into these species.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in libro de poenitentia, ponit praedictas tres species poenitentiae.

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [Cf. Hom. 30 inter 1] that these three are species of Penance.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod haec divisio est poenitentiae secundum quod est virtus. Est autem considerandum quod quaelibet virtus operatur secundum congruentiam temporis, sicut et secundum alias debitas circumstantias. Unde et virtus poenitentiae actum suum habet in hoc tempore secundum quod convenit novae legi pertinet autem ad poenitentiam ut detestetur peccata praeterita, cum proposito immutandi vitam in melius, quod est quasi poenitentiae finis. Et quia moralia recipiunt speciem secundum finem, ut in secunda parte habitum est; consequens est quod diversae species poenitentiae accipiantur secundum diversas immutationes quas poenitens intendit. Est autem triplex immutatio a poenitente intenta. Prima quidem per regenerationem in novam vitam. Et haec pertinet ad poenitentiam quae est ante Baptismum. Secunda autem immutatio est per reformationem vitae praeteritae iam corruptae. Et haec pertinet ad poenitentiam mortalium post Baptismum. Tertia autem immutatio est in perfectiorem operationem vitae. Et haec pertinet ad poenitentiam venialium, quae remittuntur per aliquem ferventem actum caritatis, ut supra dictum est.

I answer that, This is a division of penance as a virtue. Now it must be observed that every virtue acts in accordance with the time being, as also in keeping with other due circumstances, wherefore the virtue of penance has its act at this time, according to the requirements of the New Law.

Now it belongs to penance to detest one's past sins, and to purpose, at the same time, to change one's life for the better, which is the end, so to speak, of penance. And since moral matters take their species from the end, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), it is reasonable to distinguish various species of penance, according to the various changes intended by the penitent.

Accordingly there is a threefold change intended by the penitent. The first is by regeneration unto a new life, and this belongs to that penance which precedes Baptism. The second is by reforming one's past life after it has been already destroyed, and this belongs to penance for mortal sins committed after Baptism. The third is by changing to a more perfect operation of life, and this belongs to penance for venial sins, which are remitted through a fervent act of charity, as stated above (Q. 87, AA. 2, 3).

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod poenitentia quae est ante Baptismum, non est sacramentum, sed est actus virtutis disponens ad sacramentum Baptismi.

The penance which precedes Baptism is not a sacrament, but an act of virtue disposing one to that sacrament.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod poenitentia quae delet peccata mortalia delet etiam venialia, sed non convertitur. Et ideo hae duae poenitentiae se habent sicut perfectum et imperfectum.

The penance which washes away mortal sins, washes away venial sins also, but the converse does not hold. Wherefore these two species of penance are related to one another as perfect and imperfect.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ante Baptismum non sunt peccata venialia sine mortalibus. Et quia veniale sine mortali dimitti non potest, ut supra dictum est; ideo ante Baptismum non distinguitur poenitentia mortalium et venialium.

Before Baptism there are no venial sins without mortal sins. And since a venial sin cannot be remitted without mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 4), before Baptism, penance for mortal sins is not distinct from penance for venial sins.

Showing Thomas's answers only.