Articulus I
Whether Venial Sin Can Be Forgiven Without Penance?
Arg. 1 Objection 1
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veniale peccatum possit remitti sine poenitentia. Pertinet enim, ut supra dictum est, ad rationem verae poenitentiae quod non solum homo doleat de peccato praeterito, sed etiam proponat cavere de futuro. Sed sine tali proposito peccata venialia dimittuntur, cum certum sit homini quod sine peccatis venialibus praesentem vitam ducere non possit. Ergo peccata venialia possunt remitti sine poenitentia.
It would seem that venial sin can be forgiven without penance. For, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 10, ad 4), it is essential to true penance that man should not only sorrow for his past sins, but also that he should purpose to avoid them for the future. Now venial sins are forgiven without any such purpose, for it is certain that man cannot lead the present life without committing venial sins. Therefore venial sins can be forgiven without penance.
Arg. 2 Objection 2
Praeterea, poenitentia non est sine actuali displicentia peccatorum. Sed peccata venialia possunt dimitti sine displicentia eorum, sicut patet in eo qui dormiens occideretur propter Christum; statim enim evolaret, quod non contingit manentibus peccatis venialibus. Ergo peccata venialia possunt remitti sine poenitentia.
Further, there is no penance without actual displeasure at one's sins. But venial sins can be taken away without any actual displeasure at them, as would be the case if a man were to be killed in his sleep, for Christ's sake, since he would go to heaven at once, which would not happen if his venial sins remained. Therefore venial sins can be forgiven without penance.
Arg. 3 Objection 3
Praeterea, peccata venialia opponuntur fervori caritatis, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Sed unum oppositorum tollitur per aliud. Ergo per fervorem caritatis, quem contingit esse sine actuali displicentia peccati venialis, fit remissio peccatorum venialium.
Further, venial sins are contrary to the fervor of charity, as stated in the Second Part (II-II, Q. 24, A. 10). Now one contrary is removed by another. Therefore forgiveness of venial sins is caused by the fervor of charity, which may be without actual displeasure at venial sin.
Sed contra On the contrary
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de poenitentia, quod est quaedam poenitentia quae quotidie agitur in Ecclesia pro peccatis venialibus. Quae frustra esset si sine poenitentia peccata venialia possunt dimitti.
On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown], that "there is a penance which is done for venial sins in the Church every day" which would be useless if venial sins could be forgiven without Penance.
Respondeo I answer that
Respondeo dicendum quod remissio culpae, sicut dictum est, fit per coniunctionem ad Deum, a quo aliqualiter separat culpa. Sed haec separatio perfecte quidem fit per peccatum mortale, imperfecte autem per peccatum veniale, nam per peccatum mortale mens omnino a Deo avertitur, utpote contra caritatem agens; per peccatum autem veniale retardatur affectus hominis ne prompte in Deum feratur. Et ideo utrumque peccatum per poenitentiam quidem remittitur, quia per utrumque deordinatur voluntas hominis per immoderatam conversionem ad bonum creatum, sicut enim peccatum mortale remitti non potest quandiu voluntas peccato adhaeret, ita etiam nec peccatum veniale, quia, manente causa, manet effectus. Exigitur autem ad remissionem peccati mortalis perfectior poenitentia, ut scilicet homo actualiter peccatum mortale commissum detestetur quantum in ipso est, ut scilicet diligentiam adhibeat ad rememorandum singula peccata mortalia, ut singula detestetur. Sed hoc non requiritur ad remissionem venialium peccatorum. Non tamen sufficit habitualis displicentia, quae habetur per habitum caritatis vel poenitentiae virtutis, quia sic caritas non compateretur peccatum veniale, quod patet esse falsum. Unde sequitur quod requiratur quaedam virtualis displicentia, puta cum aliquis fertur hoc modo secundum affectum in Deum et res divinas ut quidquid ei occurrat quod eum ab hoc motu retardaret, displiceret ei, et doleret se hoc commisisse, etiam si actu de illo non cogitaret. Quod tamen non sufficit ad remissionem peccati mortalis, nisi quantum ad peccata oblita post diligentem inquisitionem.
I answer that, Forgiveness of sin, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 2), is effected by man being united to God from Whom sin separates him in some way. Now this separation is made complete by mortal sin, and incomplete by venial sin: because, by mortal sin, the mind through acting against charity is altogether turned away from God; whereas by venial sin man's affections are clogged, so that they are slow in tending towards God. Consequently both kinds of sin are taken away by penance, because by both of them man's will is disordered through turning inordinately to a created good; for just as mortal sin cannot be forgiven so long as the will is attached to sin, so neither can venial sin, because while the cause remains, the effect remains.
Yet a more perfect penance is requisite for the forgiveness of mortal sin, namely that man should detest actually the mortal sin which he committed, so far as lies in his power, that is to say, he should endeavor to remember each single mortal sin, in order to detest each one. But this is, not required for the forgiveness of venial sins; although it does not suffice to have habitual displeasure, which is included in the habit of charity or of penance as a virtue, since then venial sin would be incompatible with charity, which is evidently untrue. Consequently it is necessary to have a certain virtual displeasure, so that, for instance, a man's affections so tend to God and Divine things, that whatever might happen to him to hamper that tendency would be displeasing to him, and would grieve him, were he to commit it, even though he were not to think of it actually: and this is not sufficient for the remission of mortal sin, except as regards those sins which he fails to remember after a careful examination.
Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo in gratia constitutus potest vitare omnia peccata mortalia et singula; potest etiam vitare singula peccata venialia, sed non omnia; ut patet ex his quae in secunda parte dicta sunt. Et ideo poenitentia de peccatis mortalibus requirit quod homo proponat abstinere ab omnibus et singulis peccatis mortalibus. Sed ad poenitentiam peccatorum venialium requiritur quod proponat abstinere a singulis, non tamen ab omnibus, quia hoc infirmitas huius vitae non patitur. Debet tamen habere propositum se praeparandi ad peccata venialia minuenda, alioquin esset ei periculum deficiendi, cum desereret appetitum proficiendi, seu tollendi impedimenta spiritualis profectus, quae sunt peccata venialia.
When man is in a state of grace, he can avoid all mortal sins, and each single one; and he can avoid each single venial sin, but not all, as was explained in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 74, A. 8, ad 2; Q. 109, A. 8). Consequently penance for mortal sins requires man to purpose abstaining from mortal sins, all and each; whereas penance for venial sins requires man to purpose abstaining from each, but not from all, because the weakness of this life does not allow of this. Nevertheless he needs to have the purpose of taking steps to commit fewer venial sins, else he would be in danger of falling back, if he gave up the desire of going forward, or of removing the obstacles to spiritual progress, such as venial sins are.
Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2
Ad secundum dicendum quod passio pro Christo suscepta, sicut supra dictum est, obtinet vim Baptismi. Et ideo purgat ab omni culpa et mortali et veniali, nisi actualiter voluntatem peccato invenerit inhaerentem.
Death for Christ's sake, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 11), obtains the power of Baptism, wherefore it washes away all sin, both venial and mortal, unless it find the will attached to sin.
Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3
Ad tertium dicendum quod fervor caritatis virtualiter implicat displicentiam venialium peccatorum, ut supra dictum est.
The fervor of charity implies virtual displeasure at venial sins, as stated above (Q. 79, A. 4).