Tertia Pars · The Incarnation

Of the Parts of Human Nature Which Were Assumed

III, q. 5 · Four articles

Prooemium · Thomas's plan for this question

Deinde considerandum est de assumptione partium humanae naturae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum filius Dei debuerit assumere verum corpus. Secundo, utrum assumere debuerit corpus terrenum, scilicet carnem et sanguinem. Tertio, utrum assumpserit animam. Quarto, utrum assumere debuerit intellectum.

We must now consider the assumption of the parts of human nature; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?

(2) Whether He ought to have assumed an earthly body, i.e. one of flesh and blood?

(3) Whether He ought to have assumed a soul?

(4) Whether He ought to have assumed an intellect?

  1. 1 Whether the Son of God Ought to Have Assumed a True Body?
  2. 2 Whether the Son of God Ought to Have Assumed a Carnal or Earthly Body?
  3. 3 Whether the Son of God Assumed a Soul?
  4. 4 Whether the Son of God Assumed a Human Mind or Intellect?

Articulus I

Whether the Son of God Ought to Have Assumed a True Body?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non assumpserit verum corpus. Dicitur enim Philipp. II quod in similitudinem hominum factus est. Sed quod est secundum veritatem, non dicitur esse secundum similitudinem. Ergo filius Dei non assumpsit verum corpus.

It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true body. For it is written (Phil. 2:7), that He was "made in the likeness of men." But what is something in truth is not said to be in the likeness thereof. Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true body.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, assumptio corporis in nullo derogavit dignitati divinitatis, dicit enim Leo Papa, in sermone de nativitate, quod nec inferiorem naturam consumpsit glorificatio, nec superiorem minuit assumptio. Sed hoc ad dignitatem Dei pertinet quod sit omnino a corpore separatus. Ergo videtur quod per assumptionem non fuerit Deus corpori unitus.

Further, the assumption of a body in no way diminishes the dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo says (Serm. de Nativ.) that "the glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the assumption lessen the higher." But it pertains to the dignity of God to be altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by the assumption God was not united to a body.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, signa debent respondere signatis. Sed apparitiones veteris testamenti, quae fuerunt signa et figurae apparitionis Christi, non fuerunt secundum corporis veritatem, sed secundum imaginariam visionem, sicut patet Isaiae VI, vidi dominum sedentem, et cetera. Ergo videtur quod etiam apparitio filii Dei in mundum non fuerit secundum corporis veritatem, sed solum secundum imaginationem.

Further, signs ought to correspond to the realities. But the apparitions of the Old Testament which were signs of the manifestation of Christ were not in a real body, but by visions in the imagination, as is plain from Isa. 60:1: "I saw the Lord sitting," etc. Hence it would seem that the apparition of the Son of God in the world was not in a real body, but only in imagination.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest., si phantasma fuit corpus Christi, fefellit Christus. Et si fefellit, veritas non est. Est autem veritas Christus. Ergo non phantasma fuit corpus eius. Et sic patet quod verum corpus assumpsit.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 13): "If the body of Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us, He is not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. Therefore His body was not a phantom." Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, natus est Dei filius non putative, quasi imaginatum corpus habens, sed corpus verum. Et huius ratio triplex potest assignari. Quarum prima est ex ratione humanae naturae, ad quam pertinet verum corpus habere. Supposito igitur ex praemissis quod conveniens fuerit filium Dei assumere humanam naturam, consequens est quod verum corpus assumpserit. Secunda ratio sumi potest ex his quae in mysterio incarnationis sunt acta. Si enim non fuit verum corpus eius sed phantasticum, ergo nec veram mortem sustinuit; nec aliquid eorum quae de eo Evangelistae narrant, secundum veritatem gessit, sed solum secundum apparentiam quandam. Et sic etiam sequitur quod non fuit vera salus hominis subsecuta, oportet enim effectum causae proportionari. Tertia ratio potest sumi ex ipsa dignitate personae assumentis, quae cum sit veritas, non decuit ut in opere eius aliqua fictio esset. Unde et dominus hunc errorem per seipsum excludere dignatus est, Luc. ult., cum discipuli, conturbati et conterriti, putabant se spiritum videre, et non verum corpus, et ideo se eis palpandum praebuit, dicens, palpate et videte, quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere.

I answer that, As is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii). The Son of God was not born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body; but His body was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from the essence of human nature to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore granted, as already proved (Q. 4, A. 1), that it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature, He must consequently have assumed a real body. The second reason is taken from what was done in the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body was not real but imaginary, He neither underwent a real death, nor of those things which the Evangelists recount of Him, did He do any in very truth, but only in appearance; and hence it would also follow that the real salvation of man has not taken place; since the effect must be proportionate to the cause. The third reason is taken from the dignity of the Person assuming, Whom it did not become to have anything fictitious in His work, since He is the Truth. Hence our Lord Himself deigned to refute this error (Luke 24:37, 39), when the disciples, "troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit," and not a true body; wherefore He offered Himself to their touch, saying: "Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have."

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod similitudo illa exprimit veritatem humanae naturae in Christo, per modum quo omnes qui vere in humana natura existunt, similes specie esse dicuntur. Non autem intelligitur similitudo phantastica. Ad cuius evidentiam, apostolus subiungit quod factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis, quod fieri non potuisset si fuisset sola similitudo phantastica.

This likeness indicates the truth of the human nature in Christ—just as all that truly exist in human nature are said to be like in species—and not a mere imaginary likeness. In proof of this the Apostle subjoins (Phil. 2:8) that He became "obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross"; which would have been impossible, had it been only an imaginary likeness.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod per hoc quod filius Dei verum corpus assumpsit, in nullo est eius dignitas diminuta. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, exinanivit seipsum, formam servi accipiens, ut fieret servus, sed formae Dei plenitudinem non amisit. Non enim filius Dei sic assumpsit verum corpus ut forma corporis fieret, quod repugnat divinae simplicitati et puritati, hoc enim esset assumere corpus in unitate naturae, quod est impossibile, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed, salva distinctione naturae, assumpsit in unitate personae.

By assuming a true body the dignity of the Son of God is nowise lessened. Hence Augustine [Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): "He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, that He might become a servant; yet did He not lose the fulness of the form of God." For the Son of God assumed a true body, not so as to become the form of a body, which is repugnant to the Divine simplicity and purity—for this would be to assume a body to the unity of the nature, which is impossible, as is plain from what has been stated above (Q. 2, A. 1): but, the natures remaining distinct, He assumed a body to the unity of Person.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod figura respondere debet quantum ad similitudinem, non quantum ad rei veritatem, si enim per omnia esset similitudo, iam non esset signum, sed ipsa res, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Conveniens igitur fuit ut apparitiones veteris testamenti essent secundum apparentiam tantum, quasi figurae, apparitio autem filii Dei in mundo esset secundum corporis veritatem, quasi res figurata sive signata per illas figuras. Unde apostolus, Coloss. II, quae sunt umbra futurorum, corpus autem Christi.

The figure ought to correspond to the reality as regards the likeness and not as regards the truth of the thing. For if they were alike in all points, it would no longer be a likeness but the reality itself, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26). Hence it was more fitting that the apparitions of the old Testament should be in appearance only, being figures; and that the apparition of the Son of God in the world should be in a real body, being the thing prefigured by these figures. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 2:17): "Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's."

Articulus II

Whether the Son of God Ought to Have Assumed a Carnal or Earthly Body?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non habuerit corpus carnale, sive terrestre, sed caeleste. Dicit enim apostolus, I Cor. XV, primus homo de terra, terrenus, secundus homo de caelo, caelestis. Sed primus homo, scilicet Adam, fuit de terra quantum ad corpus, ut patet Gen. II. Ergo etiam secundus homo, scilicet Christus, fuit de caelo quantum ad corpus.

It would seem that Christ had not a carnal or earthly, but a heavenly body. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:41): "The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly." But the first man, i.e. Adam, was of the earth as regards his body, as is plain from Gen. 1. Therefore the second man, i.e. Christ, was of heaven as regards the body.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, I Cor. XV dicitur, caro et sanguis regnum Dei non possidebunt. Sed regnum Dei principaliter est in Christo. Ergo in ipso non est caro et sanguis, sed magis corpus caeleste.

Further, it is said (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh and blood shall not [Vulg.: 'cannot'] possess the kingdom of God." But the kingdom of God is in Christ chiefly. Therefore there is no flesh or blood in Him, but rather a heavenly body.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, omne quod est optimum est Deo attribuendum. Sed inter omnia corpora corpus nobilissimum est caeleste. Ergo tale corpus debuit Christus assumere.

Further, whatever is best is to be attributed to God. But of all bodies a heavenly body is the best. Therefore it behooved Christ to assume such a body.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod dominus dicit Luc. ult., spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Caro autem et ossa non sunt ex materia caelestis corporis, sed ex inferioribus elementis. Ergo corpus Christi non fuit corpus caeleste, sed carneum et terrenum.

On the contrary, our Lord says (Luke 24:39): "A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have." Now flesh and bones are not of the matter of heavenly bodies, but are composed of the inferior elements. Therefore the body of Christ was not a heavenly, but a carnal and earthly body.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod eisdem rationibus apparet quare corpus Christi non debuit esse caeleste, quibus ostensum est quod non debuit esse phantasticum. Primo enim, sicut non salvaretur veritas humanae naturae in Christo si corpus eius esset phantasticum, ut posuit Manichaeus; ita etiam non salvaretur si poneretur caeleste, sicut posuit Valentinus. Cum enim forma hominis sit quaedam res naturalis, requirit determinatam materiam, scilicet carnes et ossa, quae in hominis definitione poni oportet, ut patet per philosophum, in VII Metaphys. Secundo, quia hoc etiam derogaret veritati eorum quae Christus in corpore gessit. Cum enim corpus caeleste sit impassibile et incorruptibile, ut probatur in I de caelo, si filius Dei corpus caeleste assumpsisset, non vere esuriisset nec sitiisset, nec etiam passionem et mortem sustinuisset. Tertio, etiam hoc derogat veritati divinae. Cum enim filius Dei se ostenderet hominibus quasi corpus carneum et terrenum habens, fuisset falsa demonstratio si corpus caeleste habuisset. Et ideo in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus dicitur, natus est filius Dei carnem ex virginis corpore trahens, et non de caelo secum afferens.

I answer that, By the reasons which proved that the body of Christ was not an imaginary one, it may also be shown that it was not a heavenly body. First, because even as the truth of the human nature of Christ would not have been maintained had His body been an imaginary one, such as Manes supposed, so likewise it would not have been maintained if we supposed, as did Valentine, that it was a heavenly body. For since the form of man is a natural thing, it requires determinate matter, to wit, flesh and bones, which must be placed in the definition of man, as is plain from the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 39). Secondly, because this would lessen the truth of such things as Christ did in the body. For since a heavenly body is impassible and incorruptible, as is proved De Coel. i, 20, if the Son of God had assumed a heavenly body, He would not have truly hungered or thirsted, nor would he have undergone His passion and death. Thirdly, this would have detracted from God's truthfulness. For since the Son of God showed Himself to men, as if He had a carnal and earthly body, the manifestation would have been false, had He had a heavenly body. Hence (De Eccles. Dogm. ii) it is said: "The Son of God was born, taking flesh of the Virgin's body, and not bringing it with Him from heaven."

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus dicitur dupliciter de caelo descendisse. Uno modo, ratione divinae naturae, non ita quod divina natura esse in caelo defecerit; sed quia in infimis novo modo esse coepit, scilicet secundum naturam assumptam; secundum illud Ioan. III, nemo ascendit in caelum nisi qui descendit de caelo, filius hominis, qui est in caelo. Alio modo, ratione corporis, non quia ipsum corpus Christi secundum suam substantiam de caelo descenderit; sed quia virtute caelesti, idest spiritus sancti, est eius corpus formatum. Unde Augustinus dicit, ad Orosium, exponens auctoritatem inductam, caelestem dico Christum, quia non ex humano conceptus est semine. Et hoc etiam modo Hilarius exponit, in libro de Trinitate.

Christ is said in two ways to have come down from heaven. First, as regards His Divine Nature; not indeed that the Divine Nature ceased to be in heaven, but inasmuch as He began to be here below in a new way, viz. by His assumed nature, according to John 3:13: "No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven, the Son of Man, Who is in heaven."

Secondly, as regards His body, not indeed that the very substance of the body of Christ descended from heaven, but that His body was formed by a heavenly power, i.e. by the Holy Ghost. Hence Augustine, explaining the passage quoted, says (Ad Orosium [Dial. Qq. lxv, qu. 4, work of an unknown author]): "I call Christ a heavenly man because He was not conceived of human seed." And Hilary expounds it in the same way (De Trin. x).

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod caro et sanguis non accipiuntur ibi pro substantia carnis et sanguinis, sed pro corruptione carnis et sanguinis. Quae quidem in Christo non fuit quantum ad culpam. Fuit tamen ad tempus quantum ad poenam, ut opus nostrae redemptionis expleret.

Flesh and blood are not taken here for the substance of flesh and blood, but for the corruption of flesh, which was not in Christ as far as it was sinful; but as far as it was a punishment; thus, for a time, it was in Christ, that He might carry through the work of our redemption.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum ad maximam Dei gloriam pertinet quod corpus infirmum et terrenum ad tantam sublimitatem provehit. Unde in synodo Ephesina legitur verbum sancti Theophili dicentis, qualiter artificum optimi non pretiosis tantum materiebus artem ostendentes in admiratione sunt, sed, vilissimum lutum et terram dissolutam plerumque assumentes, suae disciplinae demonstrantes virtutem, multo magis laudantur; ita omnium optimus artifex, Dei verbum, non aliquam pretiosam materiam corporis caelestis apprehendens ad nos venit, sed in luto magnitudinem suae artis ostendit.

It pertains to the greatest glory of God to have raised a weak and earthly body to such sublimity. Hence in the General Council of Ephesus (P. II, Act. I) we read the saying of St. Theophilus: "Just as the best workmen are esteemed not merely for displaying their skill in precious materials, but very often because by making use of the poorest clay and commonest earth, they show the power of their craft; so the best of all workmen, the Word of God, did not come down to us by taking a heavenly body of some most precious matter, but shewed the greatness of His skill in clay."

Articulus III

Whether the Son of God Assumed a Soul?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei animam non assumpserit. Ioannes enim, incarnationis mysterium tradens, dixit, verbum caro factum est, nulla facta de anima mentione. Non autem dicitur caro factum eo quod sit in carnem conversum, sed quia carnem assumpsit. Non ergo videtur assumpsisse animam.

It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul. For John has said, teaching the mystery of the Incarnation (John 1:14): "The Word was made flesh"—no mention being made of a soul. Now it is not said that "the Word was made flesh" as if changed to flesh, but because He assumed flesh. Therefore He seems not to have assumed a soul.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, anima necessaria est corpori ad hoc quod per eam vivificetur. Sed ad hoc non fuit necessaria corpori Christi, ut videtur, quia ipsum Dei verbum est, de quo in Psalmo, domine, apud te est fons vitae. Superfluum igitur fuisset animam adesse, verbo praesente. Deus autem et natura nihil frustra faciunt, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in I de caelo. Ergo videtur quod filius Dei animam non assumpsit.

Further, a soul is necessary to the body, in order to quicken it. But this was not necessary for the body of Christ, as it would seem, for of the Word of God it is written (Ps. 35:10): Lord, "with Thee is the fountain of life." Therefore it would seem altogether superfluous for the soul to be there, when the Word was present. But "God and nature do nothing uselessly," as the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 32; ii, 56). Therefore the Word would seem not to have assumed a soul.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, ex unione animae ad corpus constituitur natura communis, quae est species humana. In domino autem Iesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. Non igitur assumpsit animam.

Further, by the union of soul and body is constituted the common nature, which is the human species. But "in the Lord Jesus Christ we are not to look for a common species," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Therefore He did not assume a soul.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano non eos audiamus qui solum corpus humanum dicunt esse susceptum a verbo Dei; et sic audiunt quod dictum est, verbum caro factum est, ut negent illum hominem vel animam, vel aliquid hominis habuisse nisi carnem solam.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxi): "Let us not hearken to such as say that only a human body was assumed by the Word of God; and take 'the Word was made flesh' to mean that the man had no soul nor any other part of a man, save flesh."

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de haeresibus, opinio primo fuit Arii, et postea Apollinaris, quod filius Dei solam carnem assumpserit, absque anima, ponentes quod verbum fuerit carni loco animae. Ex quo sequebatur quod in Christo non fuerunt duae naturae, sed una tantum, ex anima enim et carne una natura humana constituitur. Sed haec positio stare non potest, propter tria. Primo quidem, quia repugnat auctoritati Scripturae, in qua dominus de sua anima facit mentionem, Matth. XXVI, tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem; et Ioan. X, potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam. Sed ad hoc respondebat Apollinaris quod in his verbis anima metaphorice sumitur, per quem modum in veteri testamento Dei anima commemoratur, Isaiae I, Calendas vestras et solemnitates odivit anima mea. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaest., Evangelistae in evangelica narratione narrant quod miratus est Iesus, et iratus, et contristatus, et quod esuriit. Quae quidem ita demonstrant eum veram animam habuisse, sicut ex hoc quod comedit et dormivit et fatigatus est, demonstratur habuisse verum corpus humanum. Alioquin, si et haec ad metaphoram referantur, cum similia legantur in veteri testamento de Deo, peribit fides evangelicae narrationis. Aliud est enim quod prophetice nuntiatur in figuris, aliud quod secundum rerum proprietatem ab Evangelistis historice scribitur. Secundo, derogat praedictus error utilitati incarnationis, quae est liberatio hominis. Ut enim argumentatur Augustinus, in libro contra Felicianum, si, accepta carne, filius Dei animam omisit, aut, innoxiam sciens, medicinae indigentem non credidit; aut, a se alienam putans, redemptionis beneficio non donavit; aut, ex toto insanabilem iudicans, curare nequivit; aut ut vilem, et quae nullis usibus apta videretur, abiecit. Horum duo blasphemiam important in Deum. Quomodo enim dicetur omnipotens, si curare non potuit desperatam? Aut quomodo omnium Deus, si non ipse fecit animam nostram? Duobus vero aliis, in uno animae causa nescitur, in altero meritum non tenetur. Aut intelligere causam putandus est animae qui eam, ad accipiendum legem habitu insitae rationis instructam, a peccato voluntariae transgressionis nititur separare? Aut quomodo eius generositatem novit qui ignobilitatis vitio dicit despectam? Si originem attendas, pretiosior est animae substantia, si transgressionis culpam, propter intelligentiam peior est causa. Ego autem Christum et perfectam sapientiam scio, et piissimam esse non dubito, quorum primo, meliorem et prudentiae capacem non despexit; secundo, eam quae magis fuerat vulnerata, suscepit. Tertio vero, haec positio est contra ipsam incarnationis veritatem. Caro enim et ceterae partes hominis per animam speciem sortiuntur. Unde, recedente anima, non est os aut caro nisi aequivoce, ut patet per philosophum, II de anima et VII Metaphys.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 69, 55), it was first of all the opinion of Arius and then of Apollinaris that the Son of God assumed only flesh, without a soul, holding that the Word took the place of a soul to the body. And consequently it followed that there were not two natures in Christ, but only one; for from a soul and body one human nature is constituted. But this opinion cannot hold, for three reasons. First, because it is counter to the authority of Scripture, in which our Lord makes mention of His soul, Matt. 26:38: "My soul is sorrowful even unto death"; and John 10:18: "I have power to lay down My soul [animam meam: Douay: 'My life']." But to this Apollinaris replied that in these words soul is taken metaphorically, in which way mention is made in the Old Testament of the soul of God (Isa. 1:14): "My soul hateth your new moons and your solemnities." But, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), the Evangelists relate how Jesus wondered, was angered, sad, and hungry. Now these show that He had a true soul, just as that He ate, slept and was weary shows that He had a true human body: otherwise, if these things are a metaphor, because the like are said of God in the Old Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel story is undermined. For it is one thing that things were foretold in a figure, and another that historical events were related in very truth by the Evangelists. Secondly, this error lessens the utility of the Incarnation, which is man's liberation. For Augustine [Vigilius Tapsensis] argues thus (Contra Felician. xiii): "If the Son of God in taking flesh passed over the soul, either He knew its sinlessness, and trusted it did not need a remedy; or He considered it unsuitable to Him, and did not bestow on it the boon of redemption; or He reckoned it altogether incurable, and was unable to heal it; or He cast it off as worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. Now two of these reasons imply a blasphemy against God. For how shall we call Him omnipotent, if He is unable to heal what is beyond hope? Or God of all, if He has not made our soul. And as regards the other two reasons, in one the cause of the soul is ignored, and in the other no place is given to merit. Is He to be considered to understand the cause of the soul, Who seeks to separate it from the sin of wilful transgression, enabled as it is to receive the law by the endowment of the habit of reason? Or how can His generosity be known to any one who says it was despised on account of its ignoble sinfulness? If you look at its origin, the substance of the soul is more precious than the body: but if at the sin of transgression, on account of its intelligence it is worse than the body. Now I know and declare that Christ is perfect wisdom, nor have I any doubt that He is most loving; and because of the first of these He did not despise what was better and more capable of prudence; and because of the second He protected what was most wounded." Thirdly, this position is against the truth of the Incarnation. For flesh and the other parts of man receive their species through the soul. Hence, if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, as is plain from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; Metaph. vii, 34).

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cum dicitur, verbum caro factum est, caro ponitur pro toto homine, ac si diceret, verbum homo factum est, sicut Isaiae XL dicitur, videbit omnis caro salutare Dei nostri. Ideo autem totus homo per carnem significatur, quia, ut dicitur in auctoritate inducta, quia per carnem filius Dei visibilis apparuit, unde subditur et vidimus gloriam eius. Vel ideo quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest. in tota illa unitate susceptionis principale verbum est, extrema autem atque ultima caro. Volens itaque Evangelista commendare pro nobis dilectionem humilitatis Dei, verbum et carnem nominavit, omittens animam, quae est verbo inferior, carne praestantior. Rationabile etiam fuit ut nominaret carnem, quae, propter hoc quod magis distat a verbo, minus assumptibilis videbatur.

When we say, "The Word was made flesh," "flesh" is taken for the whole man, as if we were to say, "The Word was made man," as Isa. 40:5: "All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the Lord hath spoken." And the whole man is signified by flesh, because, as is said in the authority quoted, the Son of God became visible by flesh; hence it is subjoined: "And we saw His glory." Or because, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), "in all that union the Word is the highest, and flesh the last and lowest. Hence, wishing to commend the love of God's humility to us, the Evangelist mentioned the Word and flesh, leaving the soul on one side, since it is less than the Word and nobler than flesh." Again, it was reasonable to mention flesh, which, as being farther away from the Word, was less assumable, as it would seem.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum est fons vitae sicut prima causa vitae effectiva. Sed anima est principium vitae corpori tanquam forma ipsius. Forma autem est effectus agentis. Unde ex praesentia verbi magis concludi posset quod corpus esset animatum, sicut ex praesentia ignis concludi potest quod corpus cui ignis adhaeret, sit calidum.

The Word is the fountain of life, as the first effective cause of life; but the soul is the principle of the life of the body, as its form. Now the form is the effect of the agent. Hence from the presence of the Word it might rather have been concluded that the body was animated, just as from the presence of fire it may be concluded that the body, in which fire adheres, is warm.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod non est inconveniens, immo necessarium dicere quod in Christo fuit natura quae constituitur per animam corpori advenientem. Damascenus autem negat in domino Iesu Christo esse communem speciem quasi aliquid tertium resultans ex unione divinitatis et humanitatis.

It is not unfitting, indeed it is necessary to say that in Christ there was a nature which was constituted by the soul coming to the body. But Damascene denied that in Jesus Christ there was a common species, i.e. a third something resulting from the Godhead and the humanity.

Articulus IV

Whether the Son of God Assumed a Human Mind or Intellect?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod filius Dei non assumpsit mentem humanam, sive intellectum. Ubi enim est praesentia rei, non requiritur eius imago. Sed homo secundum mentem est ad imaginem Dei, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de Trinit. Cum ergo in Christo fuerit praesentia ipsius divini verbi, non oportuit ibi esse mentem humanam.

It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind or intellect. For where a thing is present, its image is not required. But man is made to God's image, as regards his mind, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 3, 6). Hence, since in Christ there was the presence of the Divine Word itself, there was no need of a human mind.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, maior lux offuscat minorem. Sed verbum Dei, quod est lux illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, ut dicitur Ioan. I, comparatur ad mentem sicut lux maior ad minorem, quia et ipsa mens quaedam lux est, quasi lucerna illuminata a prima luce, Proverb. X, lucerna domini spiraculum hominis. Ergo in Christo, qui est verbum Dei, non fuit necessarium esse mentem humanam.

Further, the greater light dims the lesser. But the Word of God, Who is "the light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," as is written John 1:9, is compared to the mind as the greater light to the lesser; since our mind is a light, being as it were a lamp enkindled by the First Light (Prov. 20:27): "The spirit of a man is the lamp of the Lord." Therefore in Christ Who is the Word of God, there is no need of a human mind.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, assumptio humanae naturae a Dei verbo dicitur eius incarnatio. Sed intellectus, sive mens humana, neque est caro neque est actus carnis, quia nullius corporis actus est, ut probatur in III de anima. Ergo videtur quod filius Dei humanam mentem non assumpserit.

Further, the assumption of human nature by the Word of God is called His Incarnation. But the intellect or human mind is nothing carnal, either in its substance or in its act, for it is not the act of a body, as is proved De Anima iii, 6. Hence it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de fide ad Petrum, firmissime tene, et nullatenus dubites, Christum, filium Dei, habentem nostri generis carnem et animam rationalem. Qui de carne sua dicit, palpate et videte, quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere, Luc. ult. Animam quoque se ostendit habere, dicens, ego pono animam meam, et iterum sumo eam, Ioan. X. Intellectum quoque se ostendit habere, dicens, discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde, Matth. XI. Et de ipso per prophetam dominus dicit, ecce intelliget puer meus, Isaiae LII.

On the contrary, Augustine [Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum xiv): "Firmly hold and nowise doubt that Christ the Son of God has true flesh and a rational soul of the same kind as ours, since of His flesh He says (Luke 24:39): 'Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.' And He proves that He has a soul, saying (John 17): 'I lay down My soul [Douay: 'life'] that I may take it again.' And He proves that He has an intellect, saying (Matt. 11:29): 'Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.' And God says of Him by the prophet (Isa. 52:13): 'Behold my servant shall understand.'"

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de haeresibus, Apollinaristae de anima Christi a Catholica Ecclesia dissenserunt, dicentes, sicut Ariani, Christum carnem solam sine anima suscepisse. In qua quaestione testimoniis evangelicis victi, mentem defuisse animae Christi dixerunt, sed pro hac ipsum verbum in ea fuisse. Sed haec positio eisdem rationibus convincitur sicut et praedicta. Primo enim, hoc adversatur narrationi evangelicae, quae commemorat eum fuisse miratum, ut patet Matth. VIII. Admiratio autem absque ratione esse non potest, quia importat collationem effectus ad causam; dum scilicet aliquis videt effectum cuius causam ignorat, et quaerit, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Secundo, repugnat utilitati incarnationis, quae est iustificatio hominis a peccato. Anima enim humana non est capax peccati, nec gratiae iustificantis, nisi per mentem. Unde praecipue oportuit mentem humanam assumi. Unde Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod Dei verbum assumpsit corpus et animam intellectualem et rationalem, et postea subdit, totus toti unitus est, ut toti mihi salutem gratificet idest, gratis faciat, quod enim inassumptibile est, incurabile est. Tertio, hoc repugnat veritati incarnationis. Cum enim corpus proportionetur animae sicut materia propriae formae, non est vera caro humana quae non est perfecta anima humana, scilicet rationali et ideo, si Christus animam sine mente habuisset, non habuisset veram carnem humanam, sed carnem bestialem, quia per solam mentem anima nostra differt ab anima bestiali. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro octogintatrium quaest., quod secundum hunc errorem sequeretur quod filius Dei beluam quandam cum figura humani corporis suscepisset. Quod iterum repugnat veritati divinae, quae nullam patitur fictionis falsitatem.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 49, 50), "the Apollinarists thought differently from the Catholic Church concerning the soul of Christ, saying with the Arians, that Christ took flesh alone, without a soul; and on being overcome on this point by the Gospel witness, they went on to say that the mind was wanting to Christ's soul, but that the Word supplied its place." But this position is refuted by the same arguments as the preceding. First, because it runs counter to the Gospel story, which relates how He marveled (as is plain from Matt. 8:10). Now marveling cannot be without reason, since it implies the collation of effect and cause, i.e. inasmuch as when we see an effect and are ignorant of its cause, we seek to know it, as is said Metaph. i, 2. Secondly, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the Incarnation, which is the justification of man from sin. For the human soul is not capable of sin nor of justifying grace except through the mind. Hence it was especially necessary for the mind to be assumed. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "the Word of God assumed a body and an intellectual and rational soul," and adds afterwards: "The whole was united to the whole, that He might bestow salvation on me wholly; for what was not assumed is not curable." Thirdly, it is against the truth of the Incarnation. For since the body is proportioned to the soul as matter to its proper form, it is not truly human flesh if it is not perfected by human, i.e. a rational soul. And hence if Christ had had a soul without a mind, He would not have had true human flesh, but irrational flesh, since our soul differs from an animal soul by the mind alone. Hence Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80) that from this error it would have followed that the Son of God "took an animal with the form of a human body," which, again, is against the Divine truth, which cannot suffer any fictitious untruth.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, ubi est ipsa res per sui praesentiam non requiritur eius imago ad hoc quod suppleat locum rei, sicut, ubi erat imperator, milites non venerabantur eius imaginem. Sed tamen requiritur cum praesentia rei imago ipsius ut perficiatur ex ipsa rei praesentia, sicut imago in cera perficitur per impressionem sigilli, et imago hominis resultat in speculo per eius praesentiam. Unde, ad perficiendam humanam mentem, necessarium fuit quod eam sibi verbum Dei univit.

Where a thing is by its presence, its image is not required to supply the place of the thing, as where the emperor is the soldiers do not pay homage to his image. Yet the image of a thing is required together with its presence, that it may be perfected by the presence of the thing, just as the image in the wax is perfected by the impression of the seal, and as the image of man is reflected in the mirror by his presence. Hence in order to perfect the human mind it was necessary that the Word should unite it to Himself.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod lux maior evacuat lucem minorem alterius corporis illuminantis, non tamen evacuat, sed perficit lucem corporis illuminati. Ad praesentiam enim solis stellarum lux obscuratur, sed aeris lumen perficitur. Intellectus autem seu mens hominis est quasi lux illuminata a luce divini verbi. Et ideo per lucem divini verbi non evacuatur mens hominis, sed magis perficitur.

The greater light dims the lesser light of another luminous body; but it does not dim, rather it perfects the light of the body illuminated—at the presence of the sun the light of the stars is put out, but the light of the air is perfected. Now the intellect or mind of man is, as it were, a light lit up by the light of the Divine Word; and hence by the presence of the Word the mind of man is perfected rather than overshadowed.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet potentia intellectiva non sit alicuius corporis actus, ipsa tamen essentia animae humanae, quae est forma corporis, requiritur quod sit nobilior, ad hoc quod habeat potentiam intelligendi. Et ideo necesse est ut corpus melius dispositum ei respondeat.

Although the intellective power is not the act of a body, nevertheless the essence of the human soul, which is the form of the body, requires that it should be more noble, in order that it may have the power of understanding; and hence it is necessary that a better disposed body should correspond to it.

Showing Thomas's answers only.