Articulus I
Whether Prophecy Is Fittingly Divided into the Prophecy of Divine Predestination, of Foreknowledge, and of Denunciation?
Arg. 1 Objection 1
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dividatur prophetia in Glossa super Matth. I, ecce virgo in utero habebit, ubi dicitur quod prophetia alia est ex praedestinatione Dei, quam necesse est omnibus modis evenire, ut sine nostro impleatur arbitrio, ut haec de qua hic agitur; alia est ex praescientia Dei, cui nostrum admiscetur arbitrium; alia est quae comminatio dicitur quae fit ob signum divinae animadversionis. Illud enim quod consequitur omnem prophetiam, non debet poni ut membrum dividens prophetiam. Sed omnis prophetia est secundum praescientiam divinam, quia prophetae legunt in libro praescientiae, ut dicit Glossa, Isaiae XXXVIII. Ergo videtur quod non debeat poni una species prophetiae quae est secundum praescientiam.
It would seem that prophecy is unfittingly divided according to a gloss on Matt. 1:23, "Behold a virgin shall be with child," where it is stated that "one kind of prophecy proceeds from the Divine predestination, and must in all respects be accomplished so that its fulfillment is independent of our will, for instance the one in question. Another prophecy proceeds from God's foreknowledge: and into this our will enters. And another prophecy is called denunciation, which is significative of God's disapproval." For that which results from every prophecy should not be reckoned a part of prophecy. Now all prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge, since the prophets "read in the book of foreknowledge," as a gloss says on Isa. 38:1. Therefore it would seem that prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be reckoned a species of prophecy.
Arg. 2 Objection 2
Praeterea, sicuti aliquid prophetatur secundum comminationem, ita etiam secundum promissionem, et utraque variatur. Dicitur enim Ierem. XVIII, repente loquar adversum gentem et adversum regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud, si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego poenitentiam, et hoc pertinet ad prophetiam comminationis. Et postea subdit de prophetia promissionis, subito loquar de gente et de regno, ut aedificem et plantem illud, si fecerit malum in oculis meis, poenitentiam agam super bono quod locutus sum ut facerem ei. Ergo, sicut ponitur prophetia comminationis, ita debet poni prophetia promissionis.
Further, just as something is foretold in denunciation, so is something foretold in promise, and both of these are subject to alteration. For it is written (Jer. 18:7, 8): "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent"—and this pertains to the prophecy of denunciation, and afterwards the text continues in reference to the prophecy of promise (Jer. 18:9, 10): "I will suddenly speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build up and plant it. If it shall do evil in My sight . . . I will repent of the good that I have spoken to do unto it." Therefore as there is reckoned to be a prophecy of denunciation, so should there be a prophecy of promise.
Arg. 3 Objection 3
Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., prophetiae genera sunt septem. Primum genus, extasis, quod est mentis excessus, sicut vidit Petrus vas submissum de caelo cum variis animalibus. Secundum genus, visio, sicut apud Isaiam dicentem, vidi dominum sedentem, et cetera. Tertium genus est somnium, sicut Iacob scalam dormiens vidit. Quartum genus est per nubem, sicut ad Moysen loquitur Deus. Quintum genus, vox de caelo, sicut ad Abraham sonuit dicens, ne mittas manum in puerum. Sextum genus, accepta parabola, sicut apud Balaam. Septimum genus, repletio spiritus sancti, sicut pene apud omnes prophetas. Ponit etiam tria genera visionum, unum, secundum oculos corporis; alterum, secundum spiritum imaginarium; tertium, per intuitum mentis. Sed haec non exprimuntur in prius dicta divisione. Ergo est insufficiens.
Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8): "There are seven kinds of prophecy. The first is an ecstasy, which is the transport of the mind: thus Peter saw a vessel descending from heaven with all manner of beasts therein. The second kind is a vision, as we read in Isaias, who says (Isa. 6:1): 'I saw the Lord sitting,' etc. The third kind is a dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder. The fourth kind is from the midst of a cloud: thus God spake to Moses. The fifth kind is a voice from heaven, as that which called to Abraham saying (Gen. 22:11): 'Lay not thy hand upon the boy.' The sixth kind is taking up a parable, as in the example of Balaam (Num. 23:7; 24:15). The seventh kind is the fullness of the Holy Ghost, as in the case of nearly all the prophets." Further, he mentions three kinds of vision; "one by the eyes of the body, another by the soul's imagination, a third by the eyes of the mind." Now these are not included in the aforesaid division. Therefore it is insufficient.
Sed contra On the contrary
Sed contra est auctoritas Hieronymi, cuius dicitur esse Glossa.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Jerome to whom the gloss above quoted is ascribed.
Respondeo I answer that
Respondeo dicendum quod species habituum et actuum in moralibus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Obiectum autem prophetiae est id quod est in cognitione divina supra humanam facultatem existens. Et ideo secundum horum differentiam distinguitur prophetia in diversas species, secundum prius dictam divisionem. Dictum est autem supra quod futurum est in divina cognitione dupliciter. Uno modo, prout est in sua causa. Et sic accipitur prophetia comminationis, quae non semper impletur, sed per eam praenuntiatur ordo causae ad effectus, qui quandoque, aliis supervenientibus, impeditur. Alio modo, praecognoscit Deus aliqua in seipsis. Vel ut fienda ab ipso. Et horum est prophetia praedestinationis, quia, secundum Damascenum, Deus praedestinat ea quae non sunt in nobis. Vel ut fienda per liberum arbitrium hominis. Et sic est prophetia praescientiae. Quae potest esse bonorum et malorum, quod non contingit de prophetia praedestinationis, quae est bonorum tantum. Et quia praedestinatio sub praescientia comprehenditur, ideo in Glossa, in principio Psalterii, ponitur tantum duplex prophetiae species, scilicet secundum praescientiam, et secundum comminationem.
I answer that, The species of moral habits and acts are distinguished according to their objects. Now the object of prophecy is something known by God and surpassing the faculty of man. Wherefore, according to the difference of such things, prophecy is divided into various species, as assigned above. Now it has been stated above (Q. 71, A. 6, ad 2) that the future is contained in the Divine knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we have the prophecy of denunciation, which is not always fulfilled. but it foretells the relation of cause to effect, which is sometimes hindered by some other occurrence supervening. Secondly, God foreknows certain things in themselves—either as to be accomplished by Himself, and of such things is the prophecy of predestination, since, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30), "God predestines things which are not in our power"—or as to be accomplished through man's free-will, and of such is the prophecy of foreknowledge. This may regard either good or evil, which does not apply to the prophecy of predestination, since the latter regards good alone. And since predestination is comprised under foreknowledge, the gloss in the beginning of the Psalter assigns only two species to prophecy, namely of foreknowledge, and of denunciation.
Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praescientia proprie dicitur praecognitio futurorum eventuum prout in seipsis sunt, et secundum hoc ponitur species prophetiae. Prout autem dicitur respectu futurorum eventuum sive secundum quod in seipsis sunt sive secundum quod sunt in causis suis, communiter se habet ad omnem speciem prophetiae.
Foreknowledge, properly speaking, denotes precognition of future events in themselves, and in this sense it is reckoned a species of prophecy. But in so far as it is used in connection with future events, whether as in themselves, or as in their causes, it is common to every species of prophecy.
Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2
Ad secundum dicendum quod prophetia promissionis comprehenditur sub prophetia comminationis, quia eadem ratio est veritatis in utraque. Denominatur tamen magis a comminatione, quia Deus pronior est ad relaxandum poenam quam ad subtrahendum promissa beneficia.
The prophecy of promise is included in the prophecy of denunciation, because the aspect of truth is the same in both. But it is denominated in preference from denunciation, because God is more inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised blessings.
Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3
Ad tertium dicendum quod Isidorus distinguit prophetiam secundum modum prophetandi. Qui quidem potest distingui vel secundum potentias cognoscitivas in homine, quae sunt sensus, imaginatio et intellectus. Et sic sumitur triplex visio, quam ponit tam ipse quam Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Vel potest sumi secundum differentiam prophetici influxus. Qui quidem, quantum ad illustrationem intellectus, significatur per repletionem spiritus sancti, quam septimo loco ponit. Quantum vero ad impressionem formarum imaginabilium, ponit tria, scilicet somnium, quod ponit tertio loco; et visionem, quae fit in vigilando respectu quorumcumque communium, quam ponit in secundo loco; et extasim, quae fit per elevationem mentis in aliqua altiora, quam ponit primo loco. Quantum vero ad sensibilia signa, ponit tria. Quia sensibile signum aut est aliqua res corporea exterius apparens visui, sicut nubes, quam ponit quarto loco. Aut est vox exterius formata ad auditum hominis delata, quam ponit quinto loco. Aut est vox per hominem formata cum similitudine alicuius rei, quod pertinet ad parabolam, quam ponit sexto loco.
Isidore divides prophecy according to the manner of prophesying. Now we may distinguish the manner of prophesying—either according to man's cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination, and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision mentioned both by him and by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7)—or according to the different ways in which the prophetic current is received. Thus as regards the enlightening of the intellect there is the "fullness of the Holy Ghost" which he mentions in the seventh place. As to the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he mentions three, namely "dreams," to which he gives the third place; "vision," which occurs to the prophet while awake and regards any kind of ordinary object, and this he puts in the second place; and "ecstasy," which results from the mind being uplifted to certain lofty things, and to this he assigns the first place. As regards sensible signs he reckons three kinds of prophecy, because a sensible sign is—either a corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as "a cloud," which he mentions in the fourth place—or a "voice" sounding from without and conveyed to man's hearing—this he puts in the fifth place—or a voice proceeding from a man, conveying something under a similitude, and this pertains to the "parable" to which he assigns the sixth place.