Secunda Secundae · Fortitude

Of Patience

II-II, q. 136 · Five articles

Prooemium · Thomas's plan for this question

Deinde considerandum est de patientia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum patientia sit virtus. Secundo, utrum sit maxima virtutum. Tertio, utrum possit haberi sine gratia. Quarto, utrum sit pars fortitudinis. Quinto, utrum sit idem cum longanimitate.

We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether patience is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?

(3) Whether it can be had without grace?

(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

(5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?

  1. 1 Whether Patience Is a Virtue?
  2. 2 Whether Patience Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
  3. 3 Whether It Is Possible to Have Patience Without Grace?
  4. 4 Whether Patience Is a Part of Fortitude?
  5. 5 Whether Patience Is the Same As Longanimity?* [Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with magnanimity.]

Articulus I

Whether Patience Is a Virtue?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia non sit virtus. Virtutes enim perfectissime sunt in patria, ut dicit Augustinus, XIV de Trin. Sed ibi non est patientia, quia nulla sunt ibi mala toleranda, secundum illud Isaiae XLIX et Apocalyps. XXI, non esurient neque sitient, et non percutiet eos aestus neque sol. Ergo patientia non est virtus.

It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according to Isa. 49:10 and Apoc. 7:16, "They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them." Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, nulla virtus in malis potest inveniri, quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem. Sed patientia quandoque in malis hominibus invenitur, sicut patet in avaris, qui multa mala patienter tolerant ut pecunias congregent, secundum illud Eccle. V cunctis diebus vitae suae comedit in tenebris, et in curis multis, et in aerumna atque tristitia. Ergo patientia non est virtus.

Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue it is "that makes its possessor good." Yet patience is sometimes found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16, "All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery and in sorrow." Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, fructus a virtutibus differunt, ut supra habitum est. Sed patientia ponitur inter fructus, ut patet Galat. V. Ergo patientia non est virtus.

Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 1, ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de patientia, virtus animi quae patientia dicitur, tam magnum Dei donum est ut etiam ipsius qui nobis eam largitur patientia praedicetur.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i): "The virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us."

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est supra, virtutes morales ordinantur ad bonum inquantum conservant bonum rationis contra impetus passionum. Inter alias autem passiones, tristitia efficax est ad impediendum bonum rationis, secundum illud II ad Cor. VII, saeculi tristitia mortem operatur; et Eccli. XXX, multos occidit tristitia, et non est utilitas in illa. Unde necesse est habere aliquam virtutem per quam bonum rationis conservetur contra tristitiam, ne scilicet ratio tristitiae succumbat. Hoc autem facit patientia. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de patientia, quod patientia hominis est qua mala aequo animo toleramus, idest sine perturbatione tristitiae, ne animo iniquo bona deseramus per quae ad meliora perveniamus. Unde manifestum est patientiam esse virtutem.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 123, A. 1), the moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. 7:10, "The sorrow of the world worketh death," and Ecclus. 30:25, "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it." Hence the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia ii): "A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal mind," i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, "lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things." It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales non remanent secundum eundem actum in patria quem habent in via, scilicet per comparationem ad bona praesentis vitae, quae non remanebunt in patria, sed per comparationem ad finem, qui erit in patria. Sicut iustitia non erit in patria circa emptiones et venditiones, et alia quae pertinent ad vitam praesentem, sed in hoc quod est subditum esse Deo. Similiter actus patientiae in patria non erit in sustinendo aliqua, sed in fruitione bonorum in quae pervenire volebamus patiendo. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod in patria non erit ipsa patientia, quae necessaria non est nisi ubi toleranda sunt mala, sed aeternum erit id quo per patientiam pervenitur.

The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven. Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that "patience itself will not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal."

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de patientia, patientes proprie dicuntur qui mala malunt non committendo ferre, quam non ferendo committere. In illis autem qui mala sustinent ut mala faciant, nec miranda nec laudanda est patientia, quae nulla est, sed miranda duritia, neganda patientia.

As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) "properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them patient."

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, fructus in sui ratione importat quandam delectationem. Sunt autem operationes virtutum delectabiles secundum seipsas, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Consuetum est autem ut nomine virtutum etiam virtutum actus significentur. Et ideo patientia, quantum ad habitum, ponitur virtus quantum autem ad delectationem quam habet in actu, ponitur fructus et praecipue quantum ad hoc quod per patientiam animus praeservatur ne obruatur tristitia.

As stated above (I-II, Q. 11, A. 1), the very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue, but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being overcome by sorrow.

Articulus II

Whether Patience Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia sit potissima virtutum. Id enim quod est perfectum est potissimum in unoquoque genere. Sed patentia habet opus perfectum, ut dicitur Iac. I. Ergo patientia est potissima virtutum.

It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now "patience hath a perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, omnes virtutes ad bonum animae ordinantur. Sed hoc praecipue videtur pertinere ad patientiam, dicitur enim Luc. XXI, in patientia vestra possidebitis animas vestras. Ergo patientia est maxima virtutum.

Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written (Luke 21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, illud quod est conservativum et causa aliorum, videtur potius esse. Sed sicut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia, patientia est radix et custos omnium virtutum. Ergo patientia est maxima virtutum.

Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxxv in Evang.) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod non enumeratur inter quatuor virtutes quas Gregorius, XXII Moral., et Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccle., vocat principales.

On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call principal.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod virtutes secundum suam rationem ordinantur ad bonum, est enim virtus quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Unde oportet quod tanto principalior sit virtus et potior, quanto magis et directius ordinat in bonum. Directius autem ad bonum ordinant hominem virtutes quae sunt constitutivae boni, quam illae quae sunt impeditivae eorum quae abducunt a bono. Et sicut inter illas quae sunt constitutivae boni tanto aliqua potior est quanto in maiori bono statuit hominem, sicut fides, spes et caritas quam prudentia et iustitia; ita etiam inter illas quae sunt impeditivae retrahentium a bono, tanto aliqua est potior quanto id quod ab ea impeditur magis a bono retrahit. Plus autem a bono retrahunt pericula mortis, circa quae est fortitudo, vel delectationes tactus, circa quae est temperantia, quam quaevis adversa, circa quae est patientia. Et ideo patientia non est potissima virtutum, sed deficit non solum a virtutibus theologicis et prudentia et iustitia, quae directe statuunt hominem in bono; sed etiam a fortitudine et temperantia, quae retrahunt a maioribus impedimentis.

I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod patientia dicitur habere opus perfectum in adversis tolerandis, ex quibus primo procedit tristitia, quam moderatur patientia; secundo ira, quam moderatur mansuetudo; tertio odium, quod tollit caritas; quarto iniustum nocumentum, quod prohibet iustitia. Tollere enim principium uniuscuiusque est perfectius. Nec tamen sequitur, si in hoc patientia est perfectior, quod sit perfectior simpliciter.

Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect.

Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, that it is more perfect simply.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod possessio importat quietum dominium. Et ideo per patientiam dicitur homo suam animam possidere, inquantum radicitus evellit passiones adversitatum, quibus anima inquietatur.

Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod patientia dicitur esse radix et custos omnium virtutum, non quasi directe eas causando et conservando, sed solum removendo prohibens.

Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but merely because it removes their obstacles.

Articulus III

Whether It Is Possible to Have Patience Without Grace?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia possit haberi sine gratia. Illud enim ad quod ratio magis inclinat, magis potest implere rationalis creatura. Sed magis est rationabile quod aliquis patiatur mala propter bonum quam propter malum. Aliqui autem patiuntur mala propter malum ex propria virtute, sine auxilio gratiae, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de patientia, quod multa in laboribus et doloribus sustinent homines propter ea quae vitiose diligunt. Ergo multo magis homo potest mala sustinere propter bonum, quod est vere patientem esse, praeter auxilium gratiae.

It seems that it is possible to have patience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that "men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sinfully." Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be truly patient.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, aliqui non existentes in statu gratiae magis abhorrent mala vitiorum quam corporalia mala, unde quidam gentilium leguntur multa mala tolerasse ne patriam proderent, aut aliquid aliud inhonestum committerent. Sed hoc est vere patientem esse. Ergo videtur quod patientia possit haberi absque auxilio gratiae.

Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help of grace.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, manifeste apparet quod aliqui propter sanitatem corporis recuperandam gravia quaedam et amara patiuntur. Salus autem animae non est minus appetibilis quam sanitas corporis. Ergo, pari ratione, pro salute animae potest aliquis multa mala sustinere, quod est vere patientem esse, absque auxilio gratiae.

Further, it is quite evident that some go through much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo, ab ipso, scilicet Deo, patientia mea.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i.e. from God, "is my patience."

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de patientia, vis desideriorum facit tolerantiam laborum et dolorum, et nemo nisi pro eo quod delectat, sponte suscipit ferre quod cruciat. Et huius ratio est quia tristitiam et dolorem secundum se abhorret animus, unde nunquam eligeret eam pati propter se, sed solum propter finem. Ergo oportet quod illud bonum propter quod aliquis vult pati mala, sit magis volitum et amatum quam illud bonum cuius privatio ingerit dolorem quem patienter toleramus. Quod autem aliquis praeferat bonum gratiae omnibus naturalibus bonis ex quorum amissione potest dolor causari, pertinet ad caritatem, quae diligit Deum super omnia. Unde manifestum est quod patientia, secundum quod est virtus, a caritate causatur, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, caritas patiens est. Manifestum est autem quod caritas non potest haberi nisi per gratiam, secundum illud Rom. V, caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Unde patet quod patientia non potest haberi sine auxilio gratiae.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which gives pleasure." The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient."

But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in natura humana, si esset integra, praevaleret inclinatio rationis, sed in natura corrupta praevalet inclinatio concupiscentiae, quae in homine dominatur. Et ideo pronior est homo ad sustinendum mala in quibus concupiscentia delectatur praesentialiter, quam tolerare mala propter bona futura quae secundum rationem appetuntur, quod tamen pertinet ad veram patientiam.

The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum politicae virtutis est commensuratum naturae humanae. Et ideo absque auxilio gratiae gratum facientis potest voluntas humana in illud tendere, licet non absque auxilio Dei. Sed bonum gratiae est supernaturale. Unde in illud non potest tendere homo per virtutem suae naturae. Et ideo non est similis ratio.

The good of a social virtue [Cf. I-II, Q. 61, A. 5] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without the help of God's grace [Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 2]. On the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod tolerantia etiam malorum quae quis sustinet propter corporis sanitatem, procedit ex amore quo homo naturaliter diligit suam carnem. Et ideo non est similis ratio de patientia, quae procedit ex amore supernaturali.

Even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.

Articulus IV

Whether Patience Is a Part of Fortitude?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia non sit pars fortitudinis. Idem enim non est pars sui ipsius. Sed patientia videtur idem esse fortitudini, quia sicut supra dictum est, proprius actus fortitudinis est sustinere; et hoc etiam pertinet ad patientiam, dicitur enim in libro sententiarum prosperi quod patientia consistit in alienis malis tolerandis. Ergo patientia non est pars fortitudinis.

It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 6), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [The quotation is from St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that "patience consists in enduring evils inflicted by others." Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, fortitudo est circa timores et audacias, ut supra habitum est, et ita est in irascibili. Sed patientia videtur esse circa tristitias, et ita videtur esse in concupiscibili. Ergo patientia non est pars fortitudinis, sed magis temperantiae.

Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 3), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, totum non potest esse sine parte. Si ergo patientia sit pars fortitudinis, fortitudo nunquam posset esse sine patientia, cum tamen fortis quandoque non toleret patienter mala, sed etiam aggrediatur eum qui mala facit. Ergo patientia non est pars fortitudinis.

Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ponit eam fortitudinis partem.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of fortitude.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod patientia est pars fortitudinis quasi potentialis, quia adiungitur fortitudini sicut virtus secundaria principali. Ad patientiam enim pertinet aliena mala aequanimiter perpeti, ut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia. In malis autem quae ab aliis inferuntur, praecipua sunt, et difficillima ad sustinendum, illa quae pertinent ad pericula mortis, circa quae est fortitudo. Unde patet quod in ista materia principalitatem tenet fortitudo, quasi vindicans sibi id quod principalius est in hac materia. Et ideo patientia adiungitur ei sicut secundaria virtus principali.

I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811).

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad fortitudinem pertinet non qualiacumque sustinere, sed illud quod est summe difficile in sustinendo, scilicet sustinere pericula mortis. Ad patientiam autem pertinere potest sustinentia quorumcumque malorum.

It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death: whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod actus fortitudinis non solum consistit in hoc quod aliquis in bono persistat contra timores futurorum periculorum, sed etiam ut non deficiat propter praesentium tristitiam sive dolorem, et ex hac parte habet affinitatem cum fortitudine patientia. Et tamen fortitudo est principaliter circa timores, ad quorum rationem pertinet fugere, quod vitat fortitudo. Patientia vero principalius est circa tristitias, nam patiens aliquis dicitur non ex hoc quod non fugit, sed ex hoc quod laudabiliter se habet in patiendo quae praesentialiter nocent, ut scilicet non inordinate ex eis tristetur. Et ideo fortitudo proprie est in irascibili, patientia autem in concupiscibili. Nec hoc impedit quin patientia sit pars fortitudinis, quia adiunctio virtutis ad virtutem non attenditur secundum subiectum, sed secundum materiam vel formam. Nec tamen patientia ponitur pars temperantiae, quamvis utraque sit in concupiscibili. Quia temperantia est solum circa tristitias quae opponuntur delectationibus tactus, puta quae sunt ex abstinentia ciborum vel venereorum, sed patientia praecipue est circa tristitias quae ab aliis inferuntur. Et iterum ad temperantiam pertinet refrenare huiusmodi tristitias, sicut et delectationes contrarias, ad patientiam autem pertinet ut propter huiusmodi tristitias, quantaecumque sint, homo non recedat a bono virtutis.

The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering (patiendo) things which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible faculty.

Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however great they be.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod patientia potest, quantum ad aliquid sui, poni pars integralis fortitudinis, de qua parte obiectio procedit, prout scilicet aliquis patienter sustinet mala quae pertinent ad pericula mortis. Nec est contra rationem patientiae quod aliquis, quando opus fuerit, insiliat in eum qui mala facit, quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super illud Matth., vade Satanas, in iniuriis propriis patientem esse laudabile est, iniurias autem Dei patienter sustinere nimis est impium. Et Augustinus dicit, in quadam epistola contra Marcellinum, quod praecepta patientiae non contrariantur bono reipublicae, pro quo conservando contra inimicos compugnatur. Secundum vero quod patientia se habet circa quaecumque alia mala, adiungitur fortitudini ut virtus secundaria principali.

It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [Homily v. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Matt. 4:10, "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked": and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that "the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our enemies." But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.

Articulus V

Whether Patience Is the Same As Longanimity?* [Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with magnanimity.]

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod patientia sit idem quod longanimitas. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de patientia, quod patientia Dei praedicatur non in hoc quod aliquod malum patiatur, sed in hoc quod expectat malos ut convertantur, unde Eccli. V dicitur, altissimus patiens redditor est. Ergo videtur quod patientia sit idem quod longanimitas.

It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God, not as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked, that they may be converted." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:4): "The Most High is a patient rewarder." Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, idem non est oppositum duobus. Sed impatientia opponitur longanimitati, per quam aliquis moram expectat, dicitur enim aliquis impatiens morae, sicut et aliorum malorum. Ergo videtur quod patientia sit idem longanimitati.

Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, sicut tempus est quaedam circumstantia malorum quae sustinentur, ita etiam locus. Sed ex parte loci non sumitur aliqua virtus quae distinguatur a patientia. Ergo similiter nec longanimitas, quae sumitur ex parte temporis, inquantum scilicet aliquis diu expectat, distinguitur a patientia.

Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from patience.

Arg. 4 Objection 4

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On the contrary, a gloss [Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom. ii] on Rom. 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and longsuffering?" says: "It seems that longanimity differs from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently."

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod Rom. II, super illud, an divitias bonitatis eius et patientiae et longanimitatis contemnis, dicit Glossa, videtur longanimitas a patientia differre, quia qui infirmitate magis quam proposito delinquunt, sustentari per longanimitatem dicuntur, qui vero pertinaci mente exultant in delictis suis, ferri patienter dicendi sunt.

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Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod sicut magnanimitas dicitur per quam aliquis habet animum tendendi in magna, ita etiam longanimitas dicitur per quam aliquis habet animum tendendi in aliquid quod in longinquum distat. Et ideo sicut magnanimitas magis respicit spem tendentem in bonum, quam audaciam vel timorem sive tristitiam quae respiciunt malum, ita etiam et longanimitas. Unde longanimitas maiorem convenientiam videtur habere cum magnanimitate quam cum patientia. Potest tamen convenire cum patientia duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia patientia, sicut et fortitudo, sustinet aliqua mala propter aliquod bonum. Quod si ex propinquo expectetur, facilius est sustinere, si autem in longinquum differatur, mala autem oporteat in praesenti sustinere, difficilius est. Secundo, quia hoc ipsum quod est differri bonum speratum, natum est causare tristitiam, secundum illud Prov. XIII, spes quae differtur affligit animam. Unde et in sustinendo huiusmodi afflictionem potest esse patientia, sicut et in sustinendo quascumque alias tristitias. Sic igitur secundum quod sub ratione mali contristantis potest comprehendi et dilatio boni sperati, quae pertinet ad longanimitatem; et labor quem homo sustinet in continuata executione boni operis, quod pertinet ad constantiam; tam longanimitas quam etiam constantia sub patientia comprehenduntur. Unde et Tullius, definiens patientiam, dicit quod patientia est, honestatis ac utilitatis causa, voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio rerum arduarum ac difficilium. Quod dicit arduarum, pertinet ad constantiam in bono; quod dicit difficilium, pertinet ad gravitatem mali, quam proprie respicit patientia; quod vero addit ac diuturna, pertinet ad longanimitatem secundum quod convenit cum patientia.

I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with magnanimity than with patience.

Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Hence there may be patience in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so far as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous evil.

For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." By saying "arduous" he refers to constancy in good; when he says "difficult" he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and by adding "continued" or "long lasting," he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in common with patience.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum et secundum.

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Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod est longinquum loco, quamvis sit remotum a nobis, tamen non est similiter remotum a natura rerum sicut illud quod est longinquum tempore. Et ideo non est similis ratio. Et praeterea quod est longinquum loco non affert difficultatem nisi ratione temporis, quia quod est longinquum loco a nobis tardius tempore ad nos potest pervenire.

That which is a long way off as to place, though distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us.

Ad 4 Reply to Objection 4

Quartum concedimus. Tamen consideranda est ratio illius differentiae quam Glossa assignat. Quia in his qui ex infirmitate peccant hoc solum videtur importabile, quod diu perseverant in malo, et ideo dicitur quod ex longanimitate supportantur. Sed hoc ipsum quod aliquis ex superbia peccat, importabile videtur, et ideo per patientiam dicuntur sustineri illi qui ex superbia peccant.

We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to be borne with patience.

Ad argumenta Reply to the objections

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This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.

Showing Thomas's answers only.