Prima Secundae · Virtues

Of the Beatitudes

I-II, q. 69 · Four articles

Prooemium · Thomas's plan for this question

Deinde considerandum est de beatitudinibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum beatitudines a donis et virtutibus distinguantur. Secundo, de praemiis beatitudinum, utrum pertineant ad hanc vitam. Tertio, de numero beatitudinum. Quarto, de convenientia praemiorum quae eis attribuuntur.

We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?

(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?

(3) Of the number of the beatitudes;

(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.

  1. 1 Whether the Beatitudes Differ from the Virtues and Gifts?
  2. 2 Whether the Rewards Assigned to the Beatitudes Refer to This Life?
  3. 3 Whether the Beatitudes Are Suitably Enumerated?
  4. 4 Whether the Rewards of the Beatitudes Are Suitably Enumerated?

Articulus I

Whether the Beatitudes Differ from the Virtues and Gifts?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudines a virtutibus et donis non distinguantur. Augustinus enim, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, attribuit beatitudines in Matthaeo enumeratas, donis spiritus sancti, Ambrosius autem, super Lucam, attribuit beatitudines ibi enumeratas quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus. Ergo beatitudines non distinguuntur a virtutibus et donis.

It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq., ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, humanae voluntatis non est nisi duplex regula, scilicet ratio, et lex aeterna, ut supra habitum est. Sed virtutes perficiunt hominem in ordine ad rationem; dona autem in ordine ad legem aeternam spiritus sancti, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo non potest esse aliquid aliud pertinens ad rectitudinem voluntatis humanae, praeter virtutes et dona. Non ergo beatitudines ab eis distinguuntur.

Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the reason and the eternal law, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; Q. 21, A. 1). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 68, AA. 1, 3, seqq.). Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, in enumeratione beatitudinum ponitur mititas, et iustitia, et misericordia; quae dicuntur esse quaedam virtutes. Ergo beatitudines non distinguuntur a virtutibus et donis.

Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod quaedam enumerantur inter beatitudines, quae nec sunt virtutes nec dona; sicut paupertas, et luctus, et pax. Differunt ergo beatitudines et a virtutibus et a donis.

On the contrary, Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace. Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, beatitudo est ultimus finis humanae vitae. Dicitur autem aliquis iam finem habere, propter spem finis obtinendi, unde et philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod pueri dicuntur beati propter spem; et apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, spe salvi facti sumus. Spes autem de fine consequendo insurgit ex hoc quod aliquis convenienter movetur ad finem, et appropinquat ad ipsum, quod quidem fit per aliquam actionem. Ad finem autem beatitudinis movetur aliquis et appropinquat per operationes virtutum; et praecipue per operationes donorum, si loquamur de beatitudine aeterna, ad quam ratio non sufficit, sed in eam inducit spiritus sanctus, ad cuius obedientiam et sequelam per dona perficimur. Et ideo beatitudines distinguuntur quidem a virtutibus et donis, non sicut habitus ab eis distincti, sed sicut actus distinguuntur ab habitibus.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 2, A. 7; Q. 3, A. 1), happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are full of hope"; and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "We are saved by hope." Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action. And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may obey and follow him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit from habit, but as act from habit.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus et Ambrosius attribuunt beatitudines donis et virtutibus, sicut actus attribuuntur habitibus. Dona autem sunt eminentiora virtutibus cardinalibus, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo Ambrosius, exponens beatitudines turbis propositas, attribuit eas virtutibus cardinalibus; Augustinus autem, exponens beatitudines discipulis propositas in monte, tanquam perfectioribus, attribuit eas donis spiritus sancti.

Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above (Q. 68, A. 8). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod non sunt alii habitus rectificantes humanam vitam, praeter virtutes et dona.

This argument proves that no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod mititas accipitur pro actu mansuetudinis, et similiter dicendum est de iustitia et de misericordia. Et quamvis haec videantur esse virtutes, attribuuntur tamen donis, quia etiam dona perficiunt hominem circa omnia circa quae perficiunt virtutes, ut dictum est.

Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues perfect him, as stated above (Q. 68, A. 2).

Articulus II

Whether the Rewards Assigned to the Beatitudes Refer to This Life?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praemia quae attribuuntur beatitudinibus, non pertineant ad hanc vitam. Dicuntur enim aliqui beati propter spem praemiorum, ut dictum est. Sed obiectum spei beatitudo est futura. Ergo praemia ista pertinent ad vitam futuram.

It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because they hope for a reward, as stated above (A. 1). Now the object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, Luc. VI, ponuntur quaedam poenae per oppositum ad beatitudines, cum dicitur, vae vobis qui saturati estis, quia esurietis. Vae vobis qui ridetis nunc, quia lugebitis et flebitis. Sed istae poenae non intelliguntur in hac vita, quia frequenter homines in hac vita non puniuntur, secundum illud Iob XXI, ducunt in bonis dies suos. Ergo nec praemia beatitudinum pertinent ad hanc vitam.

Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beatitudes, Luke 6:25, where we read: "Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep." Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according to Job 21:13: "They spend their days in wealth." Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes refer to this life.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, regnum caelorum, quod ponitur praemium paupertatis, est beatitudo caelestis; ut Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei. Plena etiam saturitas non nisi in futura vita habetur; secundum illud Psalmi XVI, satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua. Visio etiam Dei, et manifestatio filiationis divinae, ad vitam futuram pertinent; secundum illud I Ioan. III, nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quid erimus. Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. Ergo praemia illa pertinent ad vitam futuram.

Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) [Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps. 16:15: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall appear." Again, it is only in the future life that we shall see God, and that our Divine sonship will be made manifest, according to 1 John 3:2: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore these rewards refer to the future life.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, ista quidem in hac vita compleri possunt, sicut completa esse in apostolis credimus. Nam illa omnimoda, et in angelicam formam mutatio, quae post hanc vitam promittitur, nullis verbis exponi potest.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us after this life."

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod circa ista praemia expositores sacrae Scripturae diversimode sunt locuti. Quidam enim omnia ista praemia ad futuram beatitudinem pertinere dicunt, sicut Ambrosius, super Lucam. Augustinus vero dicit ea ad praesentem vitam pertinere. Chrysostomus autem, in suis homiliis, quaedam eorum dicit pertinere ad futuram vitam, quaedam autem ad praesentem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod spes futurae beatitudinis potest esse in nobis propter duo, primo quidem, propter aliquam praeparationem vel dispositionem ad futuram beatitudinem, quod est per modum meriti; alio modo, per quandam inchoationem imperfectam futurae beatitudinis in viris sanctis, etiam in hac vita. Aliter enim habetur spes fructificationis arboris cum virescit frondibus, et aliter cum iam primordia fructuum incipiunt apparere. Sic igitur ea quae in beatitudinibus tanguntur tanquam merita, sunt quaedam praeparationes vel dispositiones ad beatitudinem, vel perfectam vel inchoatam. Ea vero quae ponuntur tanquam praemia, possunt esse vel ipsa beatitudo perfecta, et sic pertinent ad futuram vitam, vel aliqua inchoatio beatitudinis, sicut est in viris perfectis, et sic praemia pertinent ad praesentem vitam. Cum enim aliquis incipit proficere in actibus virtutum et donorum, potest sperari de eo quod perveniet et ad perfectionem viae, et ad perfectionem patriae.

I answer that, Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life; and Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and some to the present life.

In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of our having a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the fruit.

Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which case they refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod spes est de futura beatitudine sicut de ultimo fine, potest etiam esse et de auxilio gratiae, sicut de eo quod ducit ad finem, secundum illud Psalmi XXVII, in Deo speravit cor meum, et adiutus sum.

Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that end, according to Ps. 27:7: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been helped."

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod mali, etsi interdum in hac vita temporales poenas non patiantur, patiuntur tamen spirituales. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I Confess., iussisti, domine, et sic est, ut poena sibi sit inordinatus animus. Et philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., de malis, quod contendit ipsorum anima, et hoc quidem huc trahit, illud autem illuc; et postea concludit, si autem sic miserum est malum esse, fugiendum est malitiam intense. Et similiter e converso boni, etsi in hac vita quandoque non habeant corporalia praemia, nunquam tamen deficiunt a spiritualibus, etiam in hac vita; secundum illud Matth. XIX, et Marc. X, centuplum accipietis etiam in hoc saeculo.

Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord—that the disordered mind should be its own punishment." The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is divided against itself . . . one part pulls this way, another that"; and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a man so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice." In like manner, although, on the other hand, the good sometimes do not receive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in this life, according to Matt. 19:29, and Mk. 10:30: "Ye shall receive a hundred times as much" even "in this time."

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia illa praemia perfecte quidem consummabuntur in vita futura, sed interim etiam in hac vita quodammodo inchoantur. Nam regnum caelorum, ut Augustinus dicit, potest intelligi perfectae sapientiae initium, secundum quod incipit in eis spiritus regnare. Possessio etiam terrae significat affectum bonum animae requiescentis per desiderium in stabilitate haereditatis perpetuae, per terram significatae. Consolantur autem in hac vita, spiritum sanctum, qui Paracletus, idest consolator, dicitur, participando. Saturantur etiam in hac vita illo cibo de quo dominus dicit, meus cibus est ut faciam voluntatem patris mei. In hac etiam vita consequuntur homines misericordiam Dei. In hac etiam vita, purgato oculo per donum intellectus, Deus quodammodo videri potest. Similiter etiam in hac vita qui motus suos pacificant, ad similitudinem Dei accedentes, filii Dei nominantur. Tamen haec perfectius erunt in patria.

All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (loc. cit.), can denote the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men. The "possession" of the land denotes the well-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal inheritance, signified by "the land." They are "comforted" in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is called the "Paraclete," i.e. the Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said (John 4:34): "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me." Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy." Again, the eye being cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, "see God." Likewise, in this life, those who are the "peacemakers" of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and are called "the children of God." Nevertheless these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in heaven.

Articulus III

Whether the Beatitudes Are Suitably Enumerated?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter enumerentur beatitudines. Attribuuntur enim beatitudines donis, ut dictum est. Donorum autem quaedam pertinent ad vitam contemplativam, scilicet sapientia et intellectus, nulla autem beatitudo ponitur in actu contemplationis, sed omnes in his quae pertinent ad vitam activam. Ergo insufficienter beatitudines enumerantur.

It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, ad vitam activam non solum pertinent dona exequentia; sed etiam quaedam dona dirigentia, ut scientia et consilium. Nihil autem ponitur inter beatitudines quod directe ad actum scientiae vel consilii pertinere videatur. Ergo insufficienter beatitudines tanguntur.

Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge and counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently indicated.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, inter dona exequentia in vita activa, timor ponitur ad paupertatem pertinere; pietas autem videtur pertinere ad beatitudinem misericordiae. Nihil autem ponitur directe ad fortitudinem pertinens. Ergo insufficienter enumerantur beatitudines.

Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.

Arg. 4 Objection 4

Praeterea, in sacra Scriptura tanguntur multae aliae beatitudines, sicut Iob V, dicitur, beatus homo qui corripitur a domino; et in Psalmo I, beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum; et Proverb. III, beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam. Ergo insufficienter beatitudines enumerantur.

Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ. Thus, it is written (Job 5:17): "Blessed is the man whom God correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly"; and (Prov. 3:13): "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom." Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.

Arg. 5 Objection 5

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On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes are indicated.

Arg. 6 Objection 6

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Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matthew 5 are too many.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra, videtur quod superflue enumerentur. Sunt enim septem dona spiritus sancti. Beatitudines autem tanguntur octo.

Praeterea, Luc. VI, ponuntur quatuor tantum beatitudines. Superflue ergo enumerantur septem, vel octo, in Matthaeo.

—

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudines istae convenientissime enumerantur. Ad cuius evidentiam, est considerandum quod triplicem beatitudinem aliqui posuerunt, quidam enim posuerunt beatitudinem in vita voluptuosa; quidam in vita activa; quidam vero in vita contemplativa. Hae autem tres beatitudines diversimode se habent ad beatitudinem futuram, cuius spe dicimur hic beati. Nam beatitudo voluptuosa, quia falsa est et rationi contraria, impedimentum est beatitudinis futurae. Beatitudo vero activae vitae dispositiva est ad beatitudinem futuram. Beatitudo autem contemplativa, si sit perfecta, est essentialiter ipsa futura beatitudo, si autem sit imperfecta, est quaedam inchoatio eius. Et ideo dominus primo quidem posuit quasdam beatitudines quasi removentes impedimentum voluptuosae beatitudinis. Consistit enim voluptuosa vita in duobus. Primo quidem, in affluentia exteriorum bonorum, sive sint divitiae, sive sint honores. A quibus quidem retrahitur homo per virtutem sic ut moderate eis utatur, per donum autem excellentiori modo, ut scilicet homo totaliter ea contemnat. Unde prima beatitudo ponitur, beati pauperes spiritu, quod potest referri vel ad contemptum divitiarum; vel ad contemptum honorum, quod fit per humilitatem. Secundo vero voluptuosa vita consistit in sequendo proprias passiones, sive irascibilis sive concupiscibilis. A sequela autem passionum irascibilis, retrahit virtus ne homo in eis superfluat, secundum regulam rationis, donum autem excellentiori modo, ut scilicet homo, secundum voluntatem divinam, totaliter ab eis tranquillus reddatur. Unde secunda beatitudo ponitur, beati mites. A sequela vero passionum concupiscibilis, retrahit virtus, moderate huiusmodi passionibus utendo, donum vero, eas, si necesse fuerit, totaliter abiiciendo; quinimmo, si necessarium fuerit, voluntarium luctum assumendo. Unde tertia beatitudo ponitur, beati qui lugent. Activa vero vita in his consistit praecipue quae proximis exhibemus, vel sub ratione debiti, vel sub ratione spontanei beneficii. Et ad primum quidem nos virtus disponit, ut ea quae debemus proximis, non recusemus exhibere, quod pertinet ad iustitiam. Donum autem ad hoc ipsum abundantiori quodam affectu nos inducit, ut scilicet ferventi desiderio opera iustitiae impleamus, sicut ferventi desiderio esuriens et sitiens cupit cibum vel potum. Unde quarta beatitudo ponitur, beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam. Circa spontanea vero dona nos perficit virtus ut illis donemus quibus ratio dictat esse donandum, puta amicis aut aliis nobis coniunctis, quod pertinet ad virtutem liberalitatis. Sed donum, propter Dei reverentiam, solam necessitatem considerat in his quibus gratuita beneficia praestat, unde dicitur Luc. XIV, cum facis prandium aut coenam, noli vocare amicos neque fratres tuos etc., sed voca pauperes et debiles etc., quod proprie est misereri. Et ideo quinta beatitudo ponitur, beati misericordes. Ea vero quae ad contemplativam vitam pertinent, vel sunt ipsa beatitudo finalis, vel aliqua inchoatio eius, et ideo non ponuntur in beatitudinibus tanquam merita, sed tanquam praemia. Ponuntur autem tanquam merita effectus activae vitae, quibus homo disponitur ad contemplativam vitam. Effectus autem activae vitae, quantum ad virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in seipso, est munditia cordis, ut scilicet mens hominis passionibus non inquinetur. Unde sexta beatitudo ponitur, beati mundo corde. Quantum vero ad virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in comparatione ad proximum, effectus activae vitae est pax; secundum illud Isaiae XXXII, opus iustitiae pax. Et ideo septima beatitudo ponitur, beati pacifici.

I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life [See Q. 3]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a beginning thereof.

And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honors; from which man is withdrawn—by a virtue so that he uses them in moderation—and by a gift, in a more excellent way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude is: "Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the irascible passions man is withdrawn—by a virtue, so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason—and by a gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's will, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is: "Blessed are the meek." From following the concupiscible passions, man is withdrawn—by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in moderation—and by a gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice of sorrow [Cf. Q. 35, A. 3]; hence the third beatitude is: "Blessed are they that mourn."

Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the former we are disposed—by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor, which pertains to justice—and by a gift, so that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice." With regard to spontaneous favors we are perfected—by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality—and by a gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty: hence it is written (Luke 14:12, 13): "When thou makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren," etc . . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth beatitude is: "Blessed are the merciful."

Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of heart." But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace, according to Isa. 32:17: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers."

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus donorum pertinentium ad vitam activam, exprimuntur in ipsis meritis, sed actus donorum pertinentium ad vitam contemplativam, exprimuntur in praemiis, ratione iam dicta. Videre enim Deum respondet dono intellectus; et conformari Deo quadam filiatione adoptiva, pertinet ad donum sapientiae.

The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift of understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God," corresponds to the gift of wisdom.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod in his quae pertinent ad activam vitam, cognitio non quaeritur propter seipsam, sed propter operationem, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Et ideo, quia beatitudo aliquid ultimum importat, non computantur inter beatitudines actus donorum dirigentium in vita activa, quos scilicet eliciunt, sicut consiliari est actus consilii, et iudicare est actus scientiae, sed magis attribuuntur eis actus operativi in quibus dirigunt, sicut scientiae lugere, et consilio misereri.

In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but, on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge, and mercy in respect of counsel.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod in attributione beatitudinum ad dona, possunt duo considerari. Quorum unum est conformitas materiae. Et secundum hoc, omnes primae quinque beatitudines possunt attribui scientiae et consilio, tanquam dirigentibus. Sed inter dona exequentia distribuuntur, ita scilicet quod esuries et sitis iustitiae, et etiam misericordia, pertineant ad pietatem, quae perficit hominem in his quae sunt ad alterum; mititas autem ad fortitudinem, dicit enim Ambrosius, super Lucam, quod fortitudinis est iram vincere, indignationem cohibere, est enim fortitudo circa passiones irascibilis; paupertas vero et luctus ad donum timoris, quo homo se retrahit a cupiditatibus et delectationibus mundi. Alio modo possumus in his beatitudinibus considerare motiva ipsarum, et sic, quantum ad aliqua eorum, oportet aliter attribuere. Praecipue enim ad mansuetudinem movet reverentia ad Deum; quae pertinet ad pietatem. Ad lugendum autem movet praecipue scientia, per quam homo cognoscit defectus suos et rerum mundanarum; secundum illud Eccle. I, qui addit scientiam, addit et dolorem. Ad esuriendum autem iustitiae opera, praecipue movet animi fortitudo. Ad miserendum vero praecipue movet consilium Dei; secundum illud Dan. IV, consilium meum regi placeat, peccata tua eleemosynis redime, et iniquitates tuas misericordiis pauperum. Et hunc modum attributionis sequitur Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte.

In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the first five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed among the executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on Luke 6:22: "It is the business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation," fortitude being about the irascible passions: poverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world.

Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things, according to Eccles. 1:18: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]." The principal motive for hungering after the works of justice is fortitude of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor." It is thus that Augustine assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4).

Ad 4 Reply to Objection 4

Ad quartum dicendum quod necesse est beatitudines omnes quae in sacra Scriptura ponuntur, ad has reduci vel quantum ad merita, vel quantum ad praemia, quia necesse est quod omnes pertineant aliquo modo vel ad vitam activam, vel ad vitam contemplativam. Unde quod dicitur, beatus vir qui corripitur a domino, pertinet ad beatitudinem luctus. Quod vero dicitur, beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum, pertinet ad munditiam cordis. Quod vero dicitur, beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam, pertinet ad praemium septimae beatitudinis. Et idem patet de omnibus aliis quae possunt induci.

All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life. Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom the Lord correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we read, "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that can be adduced.

Ad 5 Reply to Objection 5

Ad quintum dicendum quod octava beatitudo est quaedam confirmatio et manifestatio omnium praecedentium. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis est confirmatus in paupertate spiritus et mititate et aliis sequentibus, provenit quod ab his bonis propter nullam persecutionem recedit. Unde octava beatitudo quodammodo ad septem praecedentes pertinet.

The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.

Ad 6 Reply to Objection 6

Ad sextum dicendum quod Lucas narrat sermonem domini factum esse ad turbas. Unde beatitudines numerantur ab eo secundum capacitatem turbarum, quae solam voluptuosam et temporalem et terrenam beatitudinem noverunt. Unde dominus per quatuor beatitudines quatuor excludit quae ad praedictam beatitudinem pertinere videntur. Quorum primum est abundantia bonorum exteriorum, quod excludit per hoc quod dicit, beati pauperes. Secundum est quod sit bene homini quantum ad corpus, in cibis et potibus et aliis huiusmodi, et hoc excludit per secundum quod ponit, beati qui esuritis. Tertium est quod sit homini bene quantum ad cordis iucunditatem, et hoc excludit tertio, dicens, beati qui nunc fletis. Quartum est exterior hominum favor, et hoc excludit quarto, dicens, beati eritis cum vos oderint homines. Et sicut Ambrosius dicit, paupertas pertinet ad temperantiam, quae illecebrosa non quaerit; esuries ad iustitiam, quia qui esurit, compatitur, et, compatiendo, largitur; fletus ad prudentiam, cuius est flere occidua; pati odium hominum, ad fortitudinem.

Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the multitude (Luke 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure, temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. The first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by saying: "Blessed are ye poor." The second is that man be well off as to his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying in the second place: "Blessed are ye that hunger." The third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts aside by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now." The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: "Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you." And as Ambrose says on Luke 6:20, "poverty corresponds to temperance, which is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through compassion gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude."

Articulus IV

Whether the Rewards of the Beatitudes Are Suitably Enumerated?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praemia beatitudinum inconvenienter enumerentur. In regno enim caelorum, quod est vita aeterna, bona omnia continentur. Posito ergo regno caelorum, non oportuit alia praemia ponere.

It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, regnum caelorum ponitur pro praemio et in prima beatitudine et in octava. Ergo, eadem ratione, debuit poni in omnibus.

Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same ground it should have been assigned to all.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, in beatitudinibus proceditur ascendendo, sicut Augustinus dicit. In praemiis autem videtur procedi descendendo, nam possessio terrae est minus quam regnum caelorum. Ergo inconvenienter huiusmodi praemia assignantur.

Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of heaven." Therefore these rewards are unsuitably enumerated.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est auctoritas ipsius domini, praemia huiusmodi proponentis.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these rewards.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod praemia ista convenientissime assignantur, considerata conditione beatitudinum secundum tres beatitudines supra assignatas. Tres enim primae beatitudines accipiuntur per retractionem ab his in quibus voluptuosa beatitudo consistit, quam homo desiderat quaerens id quod naturaliter desideratur, non ubi quaerere debet, scilicet in Deo, sed in rebus temporalibus et caducis. Et ideo praemia trium primarum beatitudinum accipiuntur secundum ea quae in beatitudine terrena aliqui quaerunt. Quaerunt enim homines in rebus exterioribus, scilicet divitiis et honoribus, excellentiam quandam et abundantiam, quorum utrumque importat regnum caelorum, per quod homo consequitur excellentiam et abundantiam bonorum in Deo. Et ideo regnum caelorum dominus pauperibus spiritu repromisit. Quaerunt autem homines feroces et immites per litigia et bella securitatem sibi acquirere, inimicos suos destruendo. Unde dominus repromisit mitibus securam et quietam possessionem terrae viventium, per quam significatur soliditas aeternorum bonorum. Quaerunt autem homines in concupiscentiis et delectationibus mundi, habere consolationem contra praesentis vitae labores. Et ideo dominus consolationem lugentibus repromittit. Aliae vero duae beatitudines pertinent ad opera activae beatitudinis, quae sunt opera virtutum ordinantium hominem ad proximum, a quibus operibus aliqui retrahuntur propter inordinatum amorem proprii boni. Et ideo dominus attribuit illa praemia his beatitudinibus, propter quae homines ab eis discedunt. Discedunt enim aliqui ab operibus iustitiae, non reddentes debitum, sed potius aliena rapientes ut bonis temporalibus repleantur. Et ideo dominus esurientibus iustitiam, saturitatem repromisit. Discedunt etiam aliqui ab operibus misericordiae, ne se immisceant miseriis alienis. Et ideo dominus misericordibus repromittit misericordiam, per quam ab omni miseria liberentur. Aliae vero duae ultimae beatitudines pertinent ad contemplativam felicitatem seu beatitudinem, et ideo secundum convenientiam dispositionum quae ponuntur in merito, praemia redduntur. Nam munditia oculi disponit ad clare videndum, unde mundis corde divina visio repromittitur. Constituere vero pacem vel in seipso vel inter alios, manifestat hominem esse Dei imitatorem, qui est Deus unitatis et pacis. Et ideo pro praemio redditur ei gloria divinae filiationis, quae est in perfecta coniunctione ad Deum per sapientiam consummatam.

I answer that, These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness indicated above (A. 3). For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists: which happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men seek in external things, viz. riches and honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain security for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.

Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbor: from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For there are some who recede from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, again, recede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all misery.

The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the dispositions included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly: hence the clean of heart are promised that they shall see God. Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, omnia praemia ista unum sunt in re, scilicet beatitudo aeterna; quam intellectus humanus non capit. Et ideo oportuit quod per diversa bona nobis nota, describeretur, observata convenientia ad merita quibus praemia attribuuntur.

As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human intellect cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion to the merits to which those rewards are assigned.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut octava beatitudo est firmitas quaedam omnium beatitudinum, ita debentur sibi omnium beatitudinum praemia. Et ideo redit ad caput, ut intelligantur sibi consequenter omnia praemia attribui. Vel, secundum Ambrosium, pauperibus spiritu repromittitur regnum caelorum, quantum ad gloriam animae, sed passis persecutionem in corpore, quantum ad gloriam corporis.

Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. Hence it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according to Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the glory of the body.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam praemia secundum additionem se habent ad invicem. Nam plus est possidere terram regni caelorum, quam simpliciter habere, multa enim habemus quae non firmiter et pacifice possidemus. Plus est etiam consolari in regno, quam habere et possidere, multa enim cum dolore possidemus. Plus est etiam saturari quam simpliciter consolari, nam saturitas abundantiam consolationis importat. Misericordia vero excedit saturitatem, ut plus scilicet homo accipiat quam meruerit, vel desiderare potuerit. Adhuc autem maius est Deum videre, sicut maior est qui in curia regis non solum prandet, sed etiam faciem regis videt. Summam autem dignitatem in domo regia filius regis habet.

The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son.

Showing Thomas's answers only.