Articulus I
Whether Habits Increase?
Arg. 1 Objection 1
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus augeri non possint. Augmentum enim est circa quantitatem, ut dicitur in V Physic. Sed habitus non sunt in genere quantitatis, sed in genere qualitatis. Ergo circa eos augmentum esse non potest.
It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the genus [of] quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits.
Arg. 2 Objection 2
Praeterea, habitus est perfectio quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Sed perfectio, cum importet finem et terminum, non videtur posse recipere magis et minus. Ergo habitus augeri non potest.
Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.
Arg. 3 Objection 3
Praeterea, in his quae recipiunt magis et minus, contingit esse alterationem, alterari enim dicitur quod de minus calido fit magis calidum. Sed in habitibus non est alteratio, ut probatur in VII Physic. Ergo habitus augeri non possunt.
Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15, 17. Therefore habits cannot increase.
Sed contra On the contrary
Sed contra est quod fides est quidam habitus, et tamen augetur, unde discipuli domino dicunt, domine, adauge nobis fidem, ut habetur Luc. XVII. Ergo habitus augentur.
On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the disciples said to our Lord (Luke 17:5): "Lord, increase our faith." Therefore habits increase.
Respondeo I answer that
Respondeo dicendum quod augmentum, sicut et alia ad quantitatem pertinentia, a quantitatibus corporalibus ad res spirituales intelligibiles transfertur; propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad res corporeas, quae sub imaginatione cadunt. Dicitur autem in quantitatibus corporeis aliquid magnum, secundum quod ad debitam perfectionem quantitatis perducitur, unde aliqua quantitas reputatur magna in homine, quae non reputatur magna in elephante. Unde et in formis dicimus aliquid magnum, ex hoc quod est perfectum. Et quia bonum habet rationem perfecti, propter hoc in his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius, ut Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin. Perfectio autem formae dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsam formam; alio modo, secundum quod subiectum participat formam. Inquantum igitur attenditur perfectio formae secundum ipsam formam, sic dicitur ipsa esse parva vel magna; puta magna vel parva sanitas vel scientia. Inquantum vero attenditur perfectio formae secundum participationem subiecti, dicitur magis et minus; puta magis vel minus album vel sanum. Non autem ista distinctio procedit secundum hoc, quod forma habeat esse praeter materiam aut subiectum, sed quia alia est consideratio eius secundum rationem speciei suae, et alia secundum quod participatur in subiecto. Secundum hoc igitur, circa intensionem et remissionem habituum et formarum, fuerunt quatuor opiniones apud philosophos, ut Simplicius narrat in commento praedicamentorum. Plotinus enim et alii Platonici ponebant ipsas qualitates et habitus suscipere magis et minus, propter hoc quod materiales erant, et ex hoc habebant indeterminationem quandam, propter materiae infinitatem. Alii vero in contrarium ponebant quod ipsae qualitates et habitus secundum se non recipiebant magis et minus; sed qualia dicuntur magis et minus, secundum diversam participationem; puta quod iustitia non dicatur magis et minus, sed iustum. Et hanc opinionem tangit Aristoteles in praedicamentis. Tertia fuit opinio Stoicorum, media inter has. Posuerunt enim quod aliqui habitus secundum se recipiunt magis et minus, sicuti artes; quidam autem non, sicut virtutes. Quarta opinio fuit quorundam dicentium quod qualitates et formae immateriales non recipiunt magis et minus, materiales autem recipiunt. Ut igitur huius rei veritas manifestetur, considerandum est quod illud secundum quod sortitur aliquid speciem, oportet esse fixum et stans, et quasi indivisibile, quaecumque enim ad illud attingunt, sub specie continentur; quaecumque autem recedunt ab illo, vel in plus vel in minus, pertinent ad aliam speciem, vel perfectiorem vel imperfectiorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus additio vel diminutio variat speciem. Si igitur aliqua forma, vel quaecumque res, secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui, sortiatur rationem speciei; necesse est quod, secundum se considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus excedere, neque in minus deficere possit. Et huiusmodi sunt calor et albedo, et aliae huiusmodi qualitates quae non dicuntur in ordine ad aliud, et multo magis substantia, quae est per se ens. Illa vero quae recipiunt speciem ex aliquo ad quod ordinantur, possunt secundum seipsa diversificari in plus vel in minus, et nihilominus sunt eadem specie, propter unitatem eius ad quod ordinantur, ex quo recipiunt speciem. Sicut motus secundum se est intensior et remissior, et tamen remanet eadem species, propter unitatem termini, ex quo specificatur. Et idem potest considerari in sanitate, nam corpus pertingit ad rationem sanitatis, secundum quod habet dispositionem convenientem naturae animalis, cui possunt dispositiones diversae convenientes esse; unde potest variari dispositio in plus vel in minus, et tamen semper remanet ratio sanitatis. Unde philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod sanitas ipsa recipit magis et minus, non enim eadem est commensuratio in omnibus, neque in uno et eodem semper; sed remissa permanet sanitas usque ad aliquid. Huiusmodi autem diversae dispositiones vel commensurationes sanitatis se habent secundum excedens et excessum, unde si nomen sanitatis esset impositum soli perfectissimae commensurationi, tunc ipsa sanitas non diceretur maior vel minor. Sic igitur patet qualiter aliqua qualitas vel forma possit secundum seipsam augeri vel minui, et qualiter non. Si vero consideremus qualitatem vel formam secundum participationem subiecti, sic etiam inveniuntur quaedam qualitates et formae recipere magis et minus, et quaedam non. Huiusmodi autem diversitatis causam Simplicius assignat ex hoc, quod substantia secundum seipsam non potest recipere magis et minus, quia est ens per se. Et ideo omnis forma quae substantialiter participatur in subiecto, caret intensione et remissione, unde in genere substantiae nihil dicitur secundum magis et minus. Et quia quantitas propinqua est substantiae, et figura etiam consequitur quantitatem; inde est quod neque etiam in istis dicitur aliquid secundum magis aut minus. Unde philosophus dicit, in VII Physic., quod cum aliquid accipit formam et figuram, non dicitur alterari, sed magis fieri. Aliae vero qualitates, quae sunt magis distantes a substantia, et coniunguntur passionibus et actionibus, recipiunt magis et minus secundum participationem subiecti. Potest autem et magis explicari huiusmodi diversitatis ratio. Ut enim dictum est, id a quo aliquid habet speciem, oportet manere fixum et stans in indivisibili. Duobus igitur modis potest contingere quod forma non participatur secundum magis et minus. Uno modo, quia participans habet speciem secundum ipsam. Et inde est quod nulla forma substantialis participatur secundum magis et minus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod, sicut numerus non habet magis neque minus, sic neque substantia quae est secundum speciem, idest quantum ad participationem formae specificae; sed si quidem quae cum materia, idest, secundum materiales dispositiones invenitur magis et minus in substantia. Alio modo potest contingere ex hoc quod ipsa indivisibilitas est de ratione formae, unde oportet quod, si aliquid participet formam illam, quod participet illam secundum rationem indivisibilitatis. Et inde est quod species numeri non dicuntur secundum magis et minus, quia unaquaeque species in eis constituitur per indivisibilem unitatem. Et eadem ratio est de speciebus quantitatis continuae quae secundum numeros accipiuntur ut bicubitum et tricubitum; et de relationibus, ut duplum et triplum; et de figuris, ut trigonum et tetragonum. Et hanc rationem ponit Aristoteles in praedicamentis, ubi, assignans rationem quare figurae non recipiunt magis et minus, dicit, quae quidem enim recipiunt trigoni rationem et circuli, similiter trigona vel circuli sunt, quia scilicet indivisibilitas est de ipsa eorum ratione, unde quaecumque participant rationem eorum, oportet quod indivisibiliter participent. Sic igitur patet quod, cum habitus et dispositiones dicantur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, ut dicitur in VII Physic., dupliciter potest intensio et remissio in habitibus et dispositionibus considerari. Uno modo, secundum se, prout dicitur maior vel minor sanitas; vel maior vel minor scientia, quae ad plura vel pauciora se extendit. Alio modo, secundum participationem subiecti, prout scilicet aequalis scientia vel sanitas magis recipitur in uno quam in alio, secundum diversam aptitudinem vel ex natura vel ex consuetudine. Non enim habitus et dispositio dat speciem subiecto, neque iterum in sui ratione includit indivisibilitatem. Quomodo autem circa virtutes se habeat, infra dicetur.
I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8).
Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be "little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or "less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.
In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them (qualia) are said to be more or less, in respect of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are.
In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that [that], in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation to something else: and much more so, substance, which is per se being. But those things which receive their species from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and nonetheless they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which various dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2, 3): "Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health."
Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or decrease of itself, and how it cannot.
But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is per se being. And therefore every form which is participated substantially by its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect of their participation by the subject.
Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance," that is, in respect of its participation of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter," i.e. in respect of material dispositions, "more or less are found in substance."
Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.
This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": to wit, because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility.
It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility.
We shall say further on (Q. 66, A. 1) how it is with the virtues.
Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut nomen magnitudinis derivatur a quantitatibus corporalibus ad intelligibiles perfectiones formarum; ita etiam et nomen augmenti, cuius terminus est magnum.
As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the word "growth," the term of which is something great.
Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2
Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus quidem perfectio est, non tamen talis perfectio quae sit terminus sui subiecti, puta dans ei esse specificum. Neque etiam in sui ratione terminum includit, sicut species numerorum. Unde nihil prohibet quin recipiat magis et minus.
Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less.
Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3
Ad tertium dicendum quod alteratio primo quidem est in qualitatibus tertiae speciei. In qualitatibus vero primae speciei potest esse alteratio per posterius, facta enim alteratione secundum calidum et frigidum, sequitur animal alterari secundum sanum et aegrum. Et similiter, facta alteratione secundum passiones appetitus sensitivi, vel secundum vires sensitivas apprehensivas, sequitur alteratio secundum scientias et virtutes, ut dicitur in VII Physic.
Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).