Prima Secundae · The Passions

Of the Effects of Pleasure

I-II, q. 33 · Four articles

Prooemium · Thomas's plan for this question

Deinde considerandum est de effectibus delectationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum delectationis sit dilatare. Secundo, utrum delectatio causet sui sitim, vel desiderium. Tertio, utrum delectatio impediat usum rationis. Quarto, utrum delectatio perficiat operationem.

We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?

(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?

(3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?

(4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?

  1. 1 Whether Expansion Is an Effect of Pleasure?
  2. 2 Whether Pleasure Causes Thirst or Desire for Itself?
  3. 3 Whether Pleasure Hinders the Use of Reason?
  4. 4 Whether Pleasure Perfects Operation?

Articulus I

Whether Expansion Is an Effect of Pleasure?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dilatatio non sit effectus delectationis. Dilatatio enim videtur ad amorem magis pertinere, secundum quod dicit apostolus, II ad Cor. VI, cor nostrum dilatatum est. Unde et de praecepto caritatis in Psalmo CXVIII, dicitur, latum mandatum tuum nimis. Sed delectatio est alia passio ab amore. Ergo dilatatio non est effectus delectationis.

It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 6:11): "Our heart is enlarged." Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:96) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is exceeding broad." But pleasure is a distinct passion from love. Therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, ex hoc quod aliquid dilatatur, efficitur capacius ad recipiendum. Sed receptio pertinet ad desiderium, quod est rei nondum habitae. Ergo dilatatio magis videtur pertinere ad desiderium quam ad delectationem.

Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not yet possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to pleasure.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, constrictio dilatationi opponitur. Sed constrictio videtur ad delectationem pertinere, nam illud constringimus quod firmiter volumus retinere; et talis est affectio appetitus circa rem delectantem. Ergo dilatatio ad delectationem non pertinet.

Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that which we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does not pertain to pleasure.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod, ad expressionem gaudii, dicitur Isaiae LX, videbis, et affluens, et mirabitur et dilatabitur cor tuum. Ipsa etiam delectatio ex dilatatione nomen accepit ut laetitia nominetur sicut supra dictum est.

On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written (Isa. 60:5): "Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged." Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" as being derived from "dilatatio" (expansion), as stated above (Q. 31, A. 3, ad 3).

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod latitudo est quaedam dimensio magnitudinis corporalis, unde in affectionibus animae non nisi secundum metaphoram dicitur. Dilatatio autem dicitur quasi motus ad latitudinem. Et competit delectationi secundum duo quae ad delectationem requiruntur. Quorum unum est ex parte apprehensivae virtutis, quae apprehendit coniunctionem alicuius boni convenientis. Ex hac autem apprehensione apprehendit se homo perfectionem quandam adeptum, quae est spiritualis magnitudo, et secundum hoc, animus hominis dicitur per delectationem magnificari, seu dilatari. Aliud autem est ex parte appetitivae virtutis, quae assentit rei delectabili, et in ea quiescit, quodammodo se praebens ei ad eam interius capiendam. Et sic dilatatur affectus hominis per delectationem, quasi se tradens ad continendum interius rem delectantem.

I answer that, Breadth (latitudo)is a dimension of bodily magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save metaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things requisite for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable good. As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or expanded by pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable object, and rests therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus man's affection is expanded by pleasure, as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet in his quae dicuntur metaphorice, idem diversis attribui secundum diversas similitudines. Et secundum hoc, dilatatio pertinet ad amorem ratione cuiusdam extensionis, inquantum affectus amantis ad alios extenditur, ut curet non solum quae sua sunt, sed quae aliorum. Ad delectationem vero pertinet dilatatio, inquantum aliquid in seipso ampliatur, ut quasi capacius reddatur.

In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one and the same thing from being attributed to different things according to different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection of the lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own interests, but also for what concerns others. On the other hand expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more ample in itself so as to become more capacious.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod desiderium habet quidem aliquam ampliationem ex imaginatione rei desideratae, sed multo magis ex praesentia rei iam delectantis. Quia magis praebet se animus rei iam delectanti, quam rei non habitae desideratae, cum delectatio sit finis desiderii.

Desire includes a certain expansion arising from the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at the presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure in it, than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end of desire.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui delectatur, constringit quidem rem delectantem, dum ei fortiter inhaeret, sed cor suum ampliat, ut perfecte delectabili fruatur.

He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast, by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that he may enjoy it perfectly.

Articulus II

Whether Pleasure Causes Thirst or Desire for Itself?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non causet desiderium sui ipsius. Omnis enim motus cessat, cum pervenerit ad quietem. Sed delectatio est quasi quaedam quies motus desiderii, ut supra dictum est. Cessat ergo motus desiderii, cum ad delectationem pervenerit. Non ergo delectatio causat desiderium.

It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But pleasure is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore the movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, oppositum non est causa sui oppositi. Sed delectatio quodammodo desiderio opponitur, ex parte obiecti, nam desiderium est boni non habiti, delectatio vero boni iam habiti. Ergo delectatio non causat desiderium sui ipsius.

Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire for itself.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, fastidium desiderio repugnat. Sed delectatio plerumque causat fastidium. Non ergo facit sui desiderium.

Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. IV, qui biberit ex hac aqua, sitiet iterum, per aquam autem significatur, secundum Augustinum, delectatio corporalis.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (John 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes pleasures of the body.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, secundum quod est in actu; alio modo, secundum quod est in memoria. Item sitis, vel desiderium, potest dupliciter accipi, uno modo, proprie, secundum quod importat appetitum rei non habitae; alio modo, communiter, secundum quod importat exclusionem fastidii. Secundum quidem igitur quod est in actu, delectatio non causat sitim vel desiderium sui ipsius, per se loquendo, sed solum per accidens, si tamen sitis vel desiderium dicatur rei non habitae appetitus, nam delectatio est affectio appetitus circa rem praesentem. Sed contingit rem praesentem non perfecte haberi. Et hoc potest esse vel ex parte rei habitae, vel ex parte habentis. Ex parte quidem rei habitae, eo quod res habita non est tota simul, unde successive recipitur, et dum aliquis delectatur in eo quod habet, desiderat potiri eo quod restat; sicut qui audit primam partem versus, et in hoc delectatur, desiderat alteram partem versus audire, ut Augustinus dicit, IV Confess. Et hoc modo omnes fere delectationes corporales faciunt sui ipsarum sitim, quousque consummentur, eo quod tales delectationes consequuntur aliquem motum, sicut patet in delectationibus ciborum. Ex parte autem ipsius habentis, sicut cum aliquis aliquam rem in se perfectam existentem, non statim perfecte habet, sed paulatim acquirit. Sicut in mundo isto, percipientes aliquid imperfecte de divina cognitione, delectamur; et ipsa delectatio excitat sitim vel desiderium perfectae cognitionis; secundum quod potest intelligi quod habetur Eccli. XXIV, qui bibunt me, adhuc sitient. Si vero per sitim vel desiderium intelligatur sola intensio affectus tollens fastidium, sic delectationes spirituales maxime faciunt sitim vel desiderium sui ipsarum. Delectationes enim corporales, quia augmentatae, vel etiam continuatae, faciunt superexcrescentiam naturalis habitudinis, efficiuntur fastidiosae; ut patet in delectatione ciborum. Et propter hoc, quando aliquis iam pervenit ad perfectum in delectationibus corporalibus, fastidit eas, et quandoque appetit aliquas alias. Sed delectationes spirituales non superexcrescunt naturalem habitudinem, sed perficiunt naturam. Unde cum pervenitur ad consummationem in ipsis, tunc sunt magis delectabiles, nisi forte per accidens, inquantum operationi contemplativae adiunguntur aliquae operationes virtutum corporalium, quae per assiduitatem operandi lassantur. Et per hunc etiam modum potest intelligi quod dicitur Eccli. XXIV qui bibit me, adhuc sitiet. Quia etiam de Angelis, qui perfecte Deum cognoscunt, et delectantur in ipso, dicitur I Petri I, quod desiderant in eum conspicere. Si vero consideretur delectatio prout est in memoria et non in actu, sic per se nata est causare sui ipsius sitim et desiderium, quando scilicet homo redit ad illam dispositionem in qua erat sibi delectabile quod praeteriit. Si vero immutatus sit ab illa dispositione, memoria delectationis non causat in eo delectationem, sed fastidium, sicut pleno existenti memoria cibi.

I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst, or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, as excluding distaste.

Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; provided we take thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed: because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in respect of something actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of the thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first part of a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily pleasures cause thirst for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in pleasures of the table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; in which sense we may understand the words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet thirst."

On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves. Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of their causing an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even when they are protracted; as is evident in the case of pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed the natural mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection is reached, then do they afford the greatest delight: except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers, which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also we may understand those words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me shall yet thirst": for, even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is written (1 Pet. 1:12) that they "desire to look at Him."

Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that disposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quando delectatio est perfecta, tunc habet omnimodam quietem, et cessat motus desiderii tendentis in non habitum. Sed quando imperfecte habetur, tunc non omnino cessat motus desiderii tendentis in non habitum.

When pleasure is perfect, then it includes complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not possessed, ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod imperfecte habetur, secundum quid habetur, et secundum quid non habetur. Et ideo simul de eo potest esse et desiderium et delectatio.

That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently it may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod delectationes alio modo causant fastidium, et alio modo desiderium, ut dictum est.

Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in another, as stated above.

Articulus III

Whether Pleasure Hinders the Use of Reason?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non impediat usum rationis. Quies enim maxime confert ad debitum rationis usum, unde dicitur in VII Physic., quod in sedendo et quiescendo fit anima sciens et prudens; et Sap. VIII, intrans in domum meam, conquiescam cum illa, scilicet sapientia. Sed delectatio est quaedam quies. Ergo non impedit, sed magis iuvat rationis usum.

It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; and it is written (Wis. 8:16): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her," i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it helps rather than hinders the use of reason.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, ea quae non sunt in eodem, etiam si sint contraria, non se impediunt. Sed delectatio est in parte appetitiva, usus autem rationis in parte apprehensiva. Ergo delectatio non impedit rationis usum.

Further, things which are not in the same subject though they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in the appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, quod impeditur ab alio, videtur quodammodo transmutari ab ipso. Sed usus apprehensivae virtutis magis movet delectationem quam a delectatione moveatur, est enim causa delectationis. Ergo delectatio non impedit usum rationis.

Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power moves pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod delectatio corrumpit existimationem prudentiae.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence."

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., delectationes propriae adaugent operationes, extraneae vero impediunt. Est ergo quaedam delectatio quae habetur de ipso actu rationis, sicut cum aliquis delectatur in contemplando vel ratiocinando. Et talis delectatio non impedit usum rationis, sed ipsum adiuvat, quia illud attentius operamur in quo delectamur; attentio autem adiuvat operationem. Sed delectationes corporales impediunt usum rationis triplici ratione. Primo quidem, ratione distractionis. Quia, sicut iam dictum est, ad ea in quibus delectamur, multum attendimus, cum autem attentio fortiter inhaeserit alicui rei, debilitatur circa alias res, vel totaliter ab eis revocatur. Et secundum hoc, si delectatio corporalis fuerit magna, vel totaliter impediet usum rationis, ad se intentionem animi attrahendo; vel multum impediet. Secundo, ratione contrarietatis. Quaedam enim delectationes, maxime superexcedentes, sunt contra ordinem rationis. Et per hunc modum philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod delectationes corporales corrumpunt existimationem prudentiae, non autem existimationem speculativam, cui non contrariantur, puta quod triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Secundum autem primum modum, utramque impedit. Tertio modo, secundum quandam ligationem, inquantum scilicet ad delectationem corporalem sequitur quaedam transmutatio corporalis, maior etiam quam in aliis passionibus, quanto vehementius afficitur appetitus ad rem praesentem quam ad rem absentem. Huiusmodi autem corporales perturbationes impediunt usum rationis, sicut patet in vinolentis, qui habent usum rationis ligatum vel impeditum.

I answer that, As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate pleasures increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources are impediments to activity." Accordingly there is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it; because we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.

On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as we have just observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and thus if the bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else it hinders it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason. Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are contrary to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but not the speculative estimate," to which they are not opposed, "for instance that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles." In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates. Thirdly, by fettering the reason: in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the other passions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances hinder the use of reason; as may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod delectatio corporalis habet quidem quietem appetitus in delectabili, quae quies interdum contrariatur rationi; sed ex parte corporis, semper habet transmutationem. Et quantum ad utrumque, impedit rationis usum.

Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary to reason; but on the part of the body it always implies alteration. And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod vis appetitiva et apprehensiva sunt quidem diversae partes, sed unius animae. Et ideo cum intentio animae vehementer applicatur ad actum unius, impeditur ab actu contrario alterius.

The powers of the appetite and of apprehension are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently when the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod usus rationis requirit debitum usum imaginationis et aliarum virium sensitivarum, quae utuntur organo corporali. Et ideo ex transmutatione corporali usus rationis impeditur, impedito actu virtutis imaginativae et aliarum sensitivarum.

The use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised through a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers.

Articulus IV

Whether Pleasure Perfects Operation?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non perficiat operationem. Omnis enim humana operatio ab usu rationis dependet. Sed delectatio impedit usum rationis, ut dictum est. Ergo delectatio non perficit, sed debilitat operationem humanam.

It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation. For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure hinders the use of reason, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, nihil est perfectivum sui ipsius, vel suae causae. Sed delectatio est operatio, ut dicitur in VII et X Ethic., quod oportet ut intelligatur vel essentialiter, vel causaliter. Ergo delectatio non perficit operationem.

Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i.e. either in its essence or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, si delectatio perficit operationem, aut perficit ipsam sicut finis, aut sicut forma, aut sicut agens. Sed non sicut finis, quia operationes non quaeruntur propter delectationem, sed magis e converso, ut supra dictum est. Nec iterum per modum efficientis, quia magis operatio est causa efficiens delectationis. Nec iterum sicut forma, non enim perficit delectatio operationem ut habitus quidam, secundum philosophum, in X Ethic. Delectatio ergo non perficit operationem.

Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so either as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because operation is not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 2): nor as agent, because rather is it the operation that causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure does not perfect operation, as a habit does." Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod dicitur ibidem, quod delectatio operationem perficit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation."

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter operationem perficit. Uno modo, per modum finis, non quidem secundum quod finis dicitur id propter quod aliquid est; sed secundum quod omne bonum completive superveniens, potest dici finis. Et secundum hoc dicit philosophus, in X Ethic., quod delectatio perficit operationem sicut quidam superveniens finis, inquantum scilicet super hoc bonum quod est operatio, supervenit aliud bonum quod est delectatio, quae importat quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito. Secundo modo, ex parte causae agentis. Non quidem directe, quia philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod perficit delectatio operationem, non sicut medicus sanum, sed sicut sanitas. Indirecte autem, inquantum scilicet agens, quia delectatur in sua actione, vehementius attendit ad ipsam, et diligentius eam operatur. Et secundum hoc dicitur in X Ethic., quod delectationes adaugent proprias operationes, et impediunt extraneas.

I answer that, Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end added to it": that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy, but as health does": but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in Ethic. x, 5 that "pleasures increase their appropriate activities, and hinder those that are not appropriate."

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis delectatio impedit actum rationis, sed delectatio corporalis; quae non consequitur actum rationis, sed actum concupiscibilis, qui per delectationem augetur. Delectatio autem quae consequitur actum rationis, fortificat rationis usum.

It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act of reason, but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act is intensified by pleasure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises from the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in II Physic., contingit quod duo sibi invicem sunt causa, ita quod unum sit causa efficiens, et aliud causa finalis alterius. Et per hunc modum, operatio causat delectationem sicut causa efficiens; delectatio autem perficit operationem per modum finis, ut dictum est.

As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two things may be causes of one another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And in this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated above.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium patet responsio ex dictis.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.

Showing Thomas's answers only.