Prima Secundae · Human Acts

Of the Manner in Which the Will Is Moved

I-II, q. 10 · Four articles

Prooemium · Thomas's plan for this question

Deinde considerandum est de modo quo voluntas movetur. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum voluntas ad aliquid naturaliter moveatur. Secundo, utrum de necessitate moveatur a suo obiecto. Tertio, utrum de necessitate moveatur ab appetitu inferiori. Quarto, utrum de necessitate moveatur ab exteriori motivo quod est Deus.

We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?

(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?

(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?

(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?

  1. 1 Whether the Will Is Moved to Anything Naturally?
  2. 2 Whether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by Its Object?
  3. 3 Whether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by the Lower Appetite?
  4. 4 Whether the Will Is Moved of Necessity by the Exterior Mover Which Is God?

Articulus I

Whether the Will Is Moved to Anything Naturally?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur ad aliquid naturaliter. Agens enim naturale dividitur contra agens voluntarium, ut patet in principio II Physic. Non ergo voluntas ad aliquid naturaliter movetur.

It would seem that the will is not moved to anything naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary agent, as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is not moved to anything naturally.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, id quod est naturale, inest alicui semper; sicut igni esse calidum. Sed nullus motus inest voluntati semper. Ergo nullus motus est naturalis voluntati.

Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as "being hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will. Therefore no movement is natural to the will.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, natura est determinata ad unum. Sed voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ergo voluntas nihil naturaliter vult.

Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing naturally.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod motus voluntatis sequitur actum intellectus. Sed intellectus aliqua intelligit naturaliter. Ergo et voluntas aliqua vult naturaliter.

On the contrary, The movement of the will follows the movement of the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally. Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Boetius dicit in libro de duabus naturis, et philosophus in V Metaphys., natura dicitur multipliciter. Quandoque enim dicitur principium intrinsecum in rebus mobilibus. Et talis natura est vel materia, vel forma materialis, ut patet ex II Physic. Alio modo dicitur natura quaelibet substantia, vel etiam quodlibet ens. Et secundum hoc, illud dicitur esse naturale rei, quod convenit ei secundum suam substantiam. Et hoc est quod per se inest rei. In omnibus autem, ea quae non per se insunt, reducuntur in aliquid quod per se inest, sicut in principium. Et ideo necesse est quod, hoc modo accipiendo naturam, semper principium in his quae conveniunt rei, sit naturale. Et hoc manifeste apparet in intellectu, nam principia intellectualis cognitionis sunt naturaliter nota. Similiter etiam principium motuum voluntariorum oportet esse aliquid naturaliter volitum. Hoc autem est bonum in communi, in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit, sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum obiectum, et etiam ipse finis ultimus, qui hoc modo se habet in appetibilibus, sicut prima principia demonstrationum in intelligibilibus, et universaliter omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundum suam naturam. Non enim per voluntatem appetimus solum ea quae pertinent ad potentiam voluntatis; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad singulas potentias, et ad totum hominem. Unde naturaliter homo vult non solum obiectum voluntatis, sed etiam alia quae conveniunt aliis potentiis, ut cognitionem veri, quae convenit intellectui; et esse et vivere et alia huiusmodi, quae respiciunt consistentiam naturalem; quae omnia comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quadam particularia bona.

I answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.

Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature. For it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas dividitur contra naturam, sicut una causa contra aliam, quaedam enim fiunt naturaliter, et quaedam fiunt voluntarie. Est autem alius modus causandi proprius voluntati, quae est domina sui actus, praeter modum qui convenit naturae, quae est determinata ad unum. Sed quia voluntas in aliqua natura fundatur, necesse est quod motus proprius naturae, quantum ad aliquid, participetur in voluntate, sicut quod est prioris causae, participatur a posteriori. Est enim prius in unaquaque re ipsum esse, quod est per naturam, quam velle, quod est per voluntatem. Et inde est quod voluntas naturaliter aliquid vult.

The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are done voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since the will is founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as what belongs to a previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing, being itself, which is from nature, precedes volition, which is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod in rebus naturalibus id quod est naturale quasi consequens formam tantum, semper actu inest, sicut calidum igni. Quod autem est naturale sicut consequens materiam, non semper actu inest, sed quandoque secundum potentiam tantum. Nam forma est actus, materia vero potentia. Motus autem est actus existentis in potentia. Et ideo illa quae pertinent ad motum, vel quae consequuntur motum, in rebus naturalibus, non semper insunt, sicut ignis non semper movetur sursum, sed quando est extra locum suum. Et similiter non oportet quod voluntas, quae de potentia in actum reducitur dum aliquid vult, semper actu velit, sed solum quando est in aliqua dispositione determinata. Voluntas autem Dei, quae est actus purus, semper est in actu volendi.

In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality: because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is "the act of that which is in potentiality" (Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1). Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in regard to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always move upwards, but only when it is outside its own place. [The Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven, i.e. the Empyrean.] And in like manner it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure act, is always in the act of volition.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod naturae semper respondet unum, proportionatum tamen naturae. Naturae enim in genere, respondet aliquid unum in genere; et naturae in specie acceptae, respondet unum in specie; naturae autem individuatae respondet aliquid unum individuale. Cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis sicut et intellectus, respondet sibi naturaliter aliquod unum commune, scilicet bonum, sicut etiam intellectui aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum, vel ens, vel quod quid est. Sub bono autem communi multa particularia bona continentur, ad quorum nullum voluntas determinatur.

To every nature there is one thing corresponding, proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a genus, there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as species there corresponds something one specifically; and to the individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since, therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good; just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the true, or being, or "what a thing is." And under good in general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined.

Articulus II

Whether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by Its Object?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas de necessitate moveatur a suo obiecto. Obiectum enim voluntatis comparatur ad ipsam sicut motivum ad mobile, ut patet in III de anima. Sed motivum, si sit sufficiens, ex necessitate movet mobile. Ergo voluntas ex necessitate potest moveri a suo obiecto.

It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to movable, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be moved of necessity by its object.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, sicut voluntas est vis immaterialis, ita et intellectus, et utraque potentia ad obiectum universale ordinatur, ut dictum est. Sed intellectus ex necessitate movetur a suo obiecto. Ergo et voluntas a suo.

Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, by its object: therefore the will also, by its object.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, omne quod quis vult, aut est finis, aut aliquid ordinatum ad finem. Sed finem aliquis ex necessitate vult, ut videtur, quia est sicut principium in speculativis, cui ex necessitate assentimus. Finis autem est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, et sic videtur quod etiam ea quae sunt ad finem, ex necessitate velimus. Voluntas ergo ex necessitate movetur a suo obiecto.

Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end necessarily: because it is like the principle in speculative matters, to which principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason for willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod potentiae rationales, secundum philosophum, sunt ad opposita. Sed voluntas est potentia rationalis, est enim in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo voluntas se habet ad opposita. Non ergo ex necessitate movetur ad alterum oppositorum.

On the contrary, The rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas movetur dupliciter, uno modo, quantum ad exercitium actus; alio modo, quantum ad specificationem actus, quae est ex obiecto. Primo ergo modo, voluntas a nullo obiecto ex necessitate movetur, potest enim aliquis de quocumque obiecto non cogitare, et per consequens neque actu velle illud. Sed quantum ad secundum motionis modum, voluntas ab aliquo obiecto ex necessitate movetur, ab aliquo autem non. In motu enim cuiuslibet potentiae a suo obiecto, consideranda est ratio per quam obiectum movet potentiam. Visibile enim movet visum sub ratione coloris actu visibilis. Unde si color proponatur visui, ex necessitate movet visum, nisi aliquis visum avertat, quod pertinet ad exercitium actus. Si autem proponeretur aliquid visui quod non omnibus modis esset color in actu, sed secundum aliquid esset tale, secundum autem aliquid non tale, non ex necessitate visus tale obiectum videret, posset enim intendere in ipsum ex ea parte qua non est coloratum in actu, et sic ipsum non videret. Sicut autem coloratum in actu est obiectum visus, ita bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Unde si proponatur aliquod obiectum voluntati quod sit universaliter bonum et secundum omnem considerationem, ex necessitate voluntas in illud tendet, si aliquid velit, non enim poterit velle oppositum. Si autem proponatur sibi aliquod obiectum quod non secundum quamlibet considerationem sit bonum, non ex necessitate voluntas feretur in illud. Et quia defectus cuiuscumque boni habet rationem non boni, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle, quod est beatitudo. Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona, et secundum hanc considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri secundum diversas considerationes.

I answer that, The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it. Now just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sufficiens motivum alicuius potentiae non est nisi obiectum quod totaliter habet rationem motivi. Si autem in aliquo deficiat, non ex necessitate movebit, ut dictum est.

The sufficient mover of a power is none but that object that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that power. If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move of necessity, as stated above.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus ex necessitate movetur a tali obiecto quod est semper et ex necessitate verum, non autem ab eo quod potest esse verum et falsum, scilicet a contingenti, sicut et de bono dictum est.

The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by that which may be either true or false—viz. by that which is contingent: as we have said of the good.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod finis ultimus ex necessitate movet voluntatem, quia est bonum perfectum. Et similiter illa quae ordinantur ad hunc finem, sine quibus finis haberi non potest, sicut esse et vivere et huiusmodi. Alia vero, sine quibus finis haberi potest, non ex necessitate vult qui vult finem, sicut conclusiones sine quibus principia possunt esse vera, non ex necessitate credit qui credit principia.

The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and "to live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as he who assents to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the conclusions, without which the principles can still be true.

Articulus III

Whether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by the Lower Appetite?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ex necessitate moveatur a passione appetitus inferioris. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VII, non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, illud facio, quod dicitur propter concupiscentiam, quae est passio quaedam. Ergo voluntas ex necessitate movetur a passione.

It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:19): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, sicut dicitur in III Ethic., qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei. Sed non est in potestate voluntatis quod statim passionem abiiciat. Ergo non est in potestate voluntatis quod non velit illud ad quod passio se inclinat.

Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, "according as a man is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in man's power to cast aside a passion at once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to will that to which the passion inclines him.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, causa universalis non applicatur ad effectum particularem nisi mediante causa particulari, unde et ratio universalis non movet nisi mediante aestimatione particulari, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed sicut se habet ratio universalis ad aestimationem particularem, ita se habet voluntas ad appetitum sensitivum. Ergo ad aliquod particulare volendum non movetur voluntas nisi mediante appetitu sensitivo. Ergo si appetitus sensitivus sit per aliquam passionem ad aliquid dispositus, voluntas non poterit in contrarium moveri.

Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the universal reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as stated in De Anima iii, 11. But as the universal reason is to the particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the will is not moved to will something particular, except through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive appetite happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. IV, subter te erit appetitus tuus, et tu dominaberis illius. Non ergo voluntas hominis ex necessitate movetur ab appetitu inferiori.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. 4:7): "Thy lust [Vulg. 'The lust thereof'] shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, passio appetitus sensitivi movet voluntatem ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto, inquantum scilicet homo aliqualiter dispositus per passionem, iudicat aliquid esse conveniens et bonum quod extra passionem existens non iudicaret. Huiusmodi autem immutatio hominis per passionem duobus modis contingit. Uno modo, sic quod totaliter ratio ligatur, ita quod homo usum rationis non habet, sicut contingit in his qui propter vehementem iram vel concupiscentiam furiosi vel amentes fiunt, sicut et propter aliquam aliam perturbationem corporalem; huiusmodi enim passiones non sine corporali transmutatione accidunt. Et de talibus eadem est ratio sicut et de animalibus brutis, quae ex necessitate sequuntur impetum passionis, in his enim non est aliquis rationis motus, et per consequens nec voluntatis. Aliquando autem ratio non totaliter absorbetur a passione, sed remanet quantum ad aliquid iudicium rationis liberum. Et secundum hoc remanet aliquid de motu voluntatis. Inquantum ergo ratio manet libera et passioni non subiecta, intantum voluntatis motus qui manet, non ex necessitate tendit ad hoc ad quod passio inclinat. Et sic aut motus voluntatis non est in homine, sed sola passio dominatur, aut, si motus voluntatis sit, non ex necessitate sequitur passionem.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 9, A. 2), the passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious or insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such like passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in them there is neither movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.

Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent, its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, etsi voluntas non possit facere quin motus concupiscentiae insurgat, de quo apostolus dicit Rom. VII, quod odi malum, illud facio, idest concupisco; tamen potest voluntas non velle concupiscere, aut concupiscentiae non consentire. Et sic non ex necessitate sequitur concupiscentiae motum.

Although the will cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil which I will not, that I do—i.e. I desire"; yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum in homine duae sint naturae, intellectualis scilicet et sensitiva, quandoque quidem est homo aliqualis uniformiter secundum totam animam, quia scilicet vel pars sensitiva totaliter subiicitur rationi, sicut contingit in virtuosis; vel e converso ratio totaliter absorbetur a passione sicut accidit in amentibus. Sed aliquando, etsi ratio obnubiletur a passione, remanet tamen aliquid rationis liberum. Et secundum hoc potest aliquis vel totaliter passionem repellere; vel saltem se tenere ne passionem sequatur. In tali enim dispositione, quia homo secundum diversas partes animae diversimode disponitur, aliud ei videtur secundum rationem, et aliud secundum passionem.

Since there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to his reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod voluntas non solum movetur a bono universali apprehenso per rationem, sed etiam a bono apprehenso per sensum. Et ideo potest moveri ad aliquod particulare bonum absque passione appetitus sensitivi. Multa enim volumus et operamur absque passione, per solam electionem, ut maxime patet in his in quibus ratio renititur passioni.

The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion.

Articulus IV

Whether the Will Is Moved of Necessity by the Exterior Mover Which Is God?

Arg. 1 Objection 1

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ex necessitate moveatur a Deo. Omne enim agens cui resisti non potest, ex necessitate movet. Sed Deo, cum sit infinitae virtutis, resisti non potest, unde dicitur Rom. IX, voluntati eius quis resistit? Ergo Deus ex necessitate movet voluntatem.

It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is written (Rom. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore God moves the will of necessity.

Arg. 2 Objection 2

Praeterea, voluntas ex necessitate movetur in illa quae naturaliter vult, ut dictum est. Sed hoc est unicuique rei naturale, quod Deus in ea operatur, ut Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum. Ergo voluntas ex necessitate vult omne illud ad quod a Deo movetur.

Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills naturally, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3). But "whatever God does in a thing is natural to it," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3). Therefore the will wills of necessity everything to which God moves it.

Arg. 3 Objection 3

Praeterea, possibile est quo posito non sequitur impossibile. Sequitur autem impossibile, si ponatur quod voluntas non velit hoc ad quod Deus eam movet, quia secundum hoc, operatio Dei esset inefficax. Non ergo est possibile voluntatem non velle hoc ad quod Deus eam movet. Ergo necesse est eam hoc velle.

Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it: because in that case God's operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it. Therefore it wills it of necessity.

Sed contra On the contrary

Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. Non ergo ex necessitate movet voluntatem eius.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore He does not of necessity move man's will.

Respondeo I answer that

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ad providentiam divinam non pertinet naturam rerum corrumpere, sed servare. Unde omnia movet secundum eorum conditionem, ita quod ex causis necessariis per motionem divinam consequuntur effectus ex necessitate; ex causis autem contingentibus sequuntur effectus contingenter. Quia igitur voluntas est activum principium non determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa, sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet motus eius contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad quae naturaliter movetur.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things." Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.

Ad 1 Reply to Objection 1

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas divina non solum se extendit ut aliquid fiat per rem quam movet, sed ut etiam eo modo fiat quo congruit naturae ipsius. Et ideo magis repugnaret divinae motioni, si voluntas ex necessitate moveretur, quod suae naturae non competit; quam si moveretur libere, prout competit suae naturae.

The Divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.

Ad 2 Reply to Objection 2

Ad secundum dicendum quod naturale est unicuique quod Deus operatur in ipso ut sit ei naturale, sic enim unicuique convenit aliquid, secundum quod Deus vult quod ei conveniat. Non autem vult quod quidquid operatur in rebus, sit eis naturale, puta quod mortui resurgant. Sed hoc vult unicuique esse naturale, quod potestati divinae subdatur.

That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it that it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a thing, according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish that whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be natural to each thing—that it be subject to the Divine power.

Ad 3 Reply to Objection 3

Ad tertium dicendum quod, si Deus movet voluntatem ad aliquid, incompossibile est huic positioni quod voluntas ad illud non moveatur. Non tamen est impossibile simpliciter. Unde non sequitur quod voluntas a Deo ex necessitate moveatur.

If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily.

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